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To those that matter the most: 
 
 
 
To my mother… 
 
 
 
Well, son, I’ll tell you: 
Life for me ain’t been no crystal stair. 
It’s had tacks in it, 
And splinters, 
And boards torn up, 
And places with no carpet on the floor— 
Bare. 
But all the time 
I’se been a-climbin’ on, 
And reachin’ landin’s, 
And turnin’ corners, 
And sometimes goin’ in the dark 
Where there ain’t been no light. 
So boy, don’t you turn back. 
Don’t you set down on the steps 
’Cause you finds it’s kinder hard. 
Don’t you fall now— 
For I’se still goin’, honey, 
I’se still climbin’, 
And life for me ain’t been no crystal stair. 
 
- Mother to Son 
Langston Hughes 
 
 
 
 
 
Momma… We made it!  
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To the carpenters who made the table… 
We hardly appreciate the first laborers 
The creators,  
with the foresight to create space  
for faceless company 
The table at which I sit 
This space 
Is an heirloom 
Passed down and passed around 
Nicks, dings, and wobbled legs 
Its abuse and flaws 
Give it undeniable character. 
I promise to sure the foundation 
And preserve this space  
for more to assume 
 
 
To those who set the table… 
Blessed are the hands 
That prepare this meal 
Slaved in hell’s kitchen  
To nourish mouths not their own 
For those who stray from the recipe 
And season with no measurements 
To transform scraps into artful cuisines  
To feed the soul 
 
 
To those who are at the table… 
We were the darker brothers 
Sent to the kitchen 
We return well-nourished and stronger  
than they could ever envision 
We are no longer company  
At other folks’ home 
We the future carpenters 
Builders of our own 
 
 
- Untitled 
Peay 
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To those who kept me… 
 
 
 
 
We’ve shared meal seasoned by shared trauma 
Broke bread over broken systems 
But yet we have endured 
 
We’ve formed life-long bonds  
with former strangers 
we are family, rest assured. 
 
 
 
 
To the Camarillos, JD, David, Dan… 
To Ajia, Brittany, and Jasmine, Clint… 
To Sam, Karlos, and Alisa… 
To my extended academic family…  
 
I love you all, dearly. 
 
Peay  
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To the Academy 
 
I look at the world 
From awakening eyes in a black face— 
And this is what I see: 
This fenced-off narrow space    
Assigned to me. 
 
I look then at the silly walls 
Through dark eyes in a dark face— 
And this is what I know: 
That all these walls oppression builds 
Will have to go! 
 
I look at my own body    
With eyes no longer blind— 
And I see that my own hands can make 
The world that's in my mind. 
Then let us hurry, comrades, 
The road to find 
 
- I look at the world 
Langston Hughes 
 
 
 
My days are not their days. 
My ways are not their ways. 
I would not think of them, 
one way or the other, 
did not they so grotesquely 
block the view 
between me and my brother. 
 
- From: 
Staggerlee Wonders 
James Baldwin 
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Abstract 
This project has three explicit goals in mind. First, I aim to uncover how the CBC constructs 
and communicates their collective worldview to the institution. Existing literature has been essential 
to improving our understanding of how Black lawmakers behave in legislative bodies. However, it 
often falls short in considering, empirically, the contexts and commitments that are wrapped up in 
their agenda. Second, I seek to move beyond studying individualized legislative behaviors to examine 
how collective strategies are employed to promote their preferences onto the institution’s agenda. 
Finally, by working at the intersection of institutional and policy process literature and drawing on 
seldom-used methodological tools, I hoped to build on theoretical and empirical explorations into the 
representations of Black America in the House of Representatives.  
Chapter 2 examines the potential of evaluating floor speeches delivered with the intent of 
defining issues on their agenda. By defining policies according to their underlying attributes, Black 
lawmakers are able to shape policy images and shape – and potentially reshape – existing frames of 
policy issues that plague the communities that they represent. I also uncover that there is a decided 
utility in engaging in problem definition from a scholarly, organizational, and institutional perspective. 
A better understanding of issues provides policy actors a bit of clarity in taking on problems faced by 
Black Americans. In Chapter 3, I attempt to apply a theoretical explanation to changes in bill 
sponsorship trends in recent congressional sessions. I argue that the CBC a striking increase in 
legislation that receives multiple committee referrals is tied to an effort to broaden the reach of 
legislation within the chamber. Doing so increases the likelihood that these bills clear the committee 
stage. Chapter 4 set out to explore how the Black Caucus responded to institutional adversity. I find 
that the organization consolidated its messaging efforts through bill cosponsorship in the midst of a 
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long-term stent in the minority party. This can potentially free up committee chairs to do the work of 
the party while rank and file members can invest their time and effort into issue advocacy. 
Taken together, it is my hope that the preceding chapters serve as a first step in re-examining 
the collective representation of Black interest in Congress. In doing so, I find it essential that we invest 
in updating our understanding of the modern Congressional Black Caucus as they increase in numbers, 
influence, and outcomes. This is much different than investigating the behavior Black lawmakers. 
Examining the Caucus means, first, examining the caucus in a way that distinguishes the organization 
from the preferences and behaviors of individual Black lawmakers. This also means that there should 
be a considerable amount of effort devoted to bringing to light organizational features and strategies 
that shape the collective behavior within the chamber. To this end, I prescribe four avenues that 
researchers should consider to broaden the examination of Black representation. 
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Introduction: “It Takes a Village”  
A Re-examination of Black-Interest Advocacy, Collective Representation, & the Modern 
Congressional Black Caucus 
 
 
“[…] except for civil rights issues, blacks in Congress are frequently an isolated, invisible, 
inconsequential minority unable to enact (or even get serious debate and deliberation on) 
proposals it deems minimally necessary to meliorate the problems of joblessness, crime and 
dispossession that plague its core constituency”. 
 
- Robert C. Smith in We Have No Leaders (1996, 222) 
 
 
“The sooner we become organized for group action, the more effective we can become.” 
 
- Former CBC Chairman, Rep. Charles Diggs (D – MI) 
 
 
 
 
“It takes a village...”: an adage that has long been codified in the lexicon of the Black community. 
The idea that advancement is the product of a collective influence - through socialization, monitoring, 
education, protection, discipline, mentoring, and a comprehensive long-term investment - is one that 
is not only firmly held within the African American community, it is also reinforced and reciprocated 
in everyday interactions. In a sense, it is second nature for Blacks in America to feel a certain 
responsibility to the well-being of your own and work towards its collective advancement.  
For most Blacks in America, the village is not an option, it is usually a necessity. Operating in 
spaces defined by whiteness means that individuals seldom achieve their goals without the assistance 
of a community - a tribe of their own with a collective investment in their success. The village is a sense 
of communal belonging and collective activity - driven by the desire to form cohesive units from like-
minded and homophilous backgrounds - that often branches out to racially hostile institutions of 
higher learning and industries that have displayed a historical propensity to actively work to oppress 
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the racial progress. In the absence of a designated space, it provides an arena to operate, organize, and 
strategize.  
The Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) was established in 1971 to provide Black lawmakers 
with its own village - a space for the original thirteen founding members to organize, strategize, and 
coordinate activities within the chambers of Congress (Barnett 1977; 1975; Swain 1993; Singh 1998; 
Owens 2011; Canon 1995; Tate 2003; 2014). Over time, the caucus established extra-party behaviors 
to account for and adapt to institutional neglect. Simply put, minority lawmakers sought to remedy 
the deprivation of information brought on by the denial of access to key committees. They looked to 
revive the voices of those that had been silenced as a result of interpersonal marginalization. They 
needed a safe space to deliberate, strategize, and evaluate the status quo. Most importantly, they saw 
the need for a collective body with the force, influence, and desire to challenge centuries of agenda 
denial in areas designed to advance Black communities. 
Stevens and colleagues add to the desires of groups, like the Black Caucus, arguing they often 
form due to perceived structural and motivational deficiencies in Congress’ ability or desire to 
adequately address their policy concerns.  They find, caucuses organize – out of necessity –  in order 
to satisfy their fiduciary responsibilities to pursue issues where (1) “there is no single place within the 
formal congressional structure in which the leadership functions are performed”, (2) “there is no 
assurance that Congress will recognize or deal with the relatedness of the various aspects of a 
problem”, and (3) “there is no effective institutional source of initiative for overcoming the disputes 
over jurisdictional turf or for working with interest groups, administration spokesmen, and other 
members to build winning floor coalitions” (Stevens, Mulhollan, and Rundquist 1981, 428). In doing 
so, the caucus also needs a means to account for change within the institution that had tremendous 
effects on their ability to successfully advocate for change in Black interest. 
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Scholarly Critique of the Early Congressional Black Caucus 
For Black lawmakers – and those that study them – the glaring question that remained 
unanswered in early explorations of collective behavior is that of the disconnect between an increase 
in Black membership in the chamber and a noticeable lack in substantive, positive outcomes in Black-
interest areas (Jones and Baumgartner 2005, 44). For the near entirety of the twentieth century and 
first decade of the twenty-first, Black issues struggled to gain traction in federal policy-making 
institutions. In his comprehensive analysis of the CBC, Robert Singh (1998, 201) settles on a raw 
assessment of their effectiveness through the 103rd Congress. He argues, “The organization of Black 
legislators in a caucus has not altered the fundamentally unequal and inferior position of many Blacks 
in the post-civil rights era, nor has it undermined the continued existence of ‘two nations’ in America: 
separate, unequal, mutually hostile, suspicious, and antagonistic”. This is not to say that advances had 
not been achieved. However, policies rarely deviated from the status quo in a meaningful way, and 
incremental change was not been a palatable consequence for onlookers and constituencies hoping 
that increased congressional representation would translate into sweeping policy success. As Singh 
and others note, “modest advances represented an inadequate substitute for rapid and comprehensive 
alterations in economic and social policy (Singh 1998, 104).”.  
Black lawmakers in American political institutions have always been faced with two very 
specific burdens when seeking out policy change for their constituencies. On one hand, they must 
fulfil the role of cogs in a well-oiled political institution with long-established traditions, practices, and 
mechanism for control. The two-party system that has dominated electoral and institutional aspects 
of American politics has all but assured access to the larger is agenda is limited. A multitude of 
institutional forces are products of institutional arrangements of power, and those arrangements are 
constantly working against the collective advancement of Black constituencies.  On the other hand, 
the advocacy for racial advancement means minority representative s engage in collective behaviors 
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that may not be facilitated by the traditional party structure. The advancement of the Black community 
required either (1) change the culture of the institution, (2) change the image of policy issues, or (3) 
change the collective practices of the caucus. This duality presented very real challenges for Black 
lawmakers – and for those that study them.  
Robert C. Smith (1996, 222) painted a rather bleak picture of the legislative influence of the 
Congressional Black Caucus in its first twenty years of existence in We Have No Leaders, arguing their 
relegation to “an isolated, invisible, inconsequential minority” extended beyond their inability to 
achieve non-incremental policy change. However, as the organization rapidly approaches its fiftieth 
year in existence, the CBC had morphed into one of the more influential legislative organizations with 
a fifty-five-member roster that occupies chairmanships of five full committees and twenty-eight 
subcommittees in the House of Representatives. Additionally, among its membership is the Majority 
Whip - James Clyburn (D-SC) - and the Chair of the House Democratic Caucus - Hakeem Jefferies 
(D-NY). The village has certainly evolved in size, collective influence, and strategy. One thing has 
remained consistent: the organization remains the collective body tasked with improving conditions 
for the national Black constituency that they represent. 
If we are to understand how – if at all – conditions Black lawmakers have changed from an 
organization with “relatively little leverage or influence in congressional decision making” (Smith 1996, 
221) to “major players in the Democratic Party” (Tate 2014, 149),  one must first engage conditions 
that create the former conditions and behaviors that could lead to the latter. I dedicate the remainder 
of this project posing two questions. First, I ask how the Congressional Black Caucus works 
collectively from within the institution to shift and maintain attention on Black interests in the House 
of Representatives? In the process, I seek to determine how these processes differ from previous 
tactics taken by earlier iterations of the CBC.  
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Scope of Analysis 
 
There are three explicit goals of this analysis. First, I seek to shed light on the collective worldview 
that shape the policy pursuits of the Congressional Black Caucus. Second, I aim to evaluate how 
strategies employed by the Congressional Black Caucus to promote their collective policy preferences 
onto the institutional agenda have evolved. Finally, I hope to advance the empirical and theoretical 
examination of Black representation in American political institutions. As a function of these goals, 
the articles presented in this collection will take on two major re-occurring themes.  
 
A Collective Agenda 
 This study takes a significant departure from the two dominant practices in studying the 
representation of Black interests in Congress – practices that have shaped both the scope of inquiry 
and products of those scholarly examinations. One common means of exploring Black-interest 
representation comes in selecting issue areas with real and perceived inequalities and discrepancies in 
outcomes – i.e. civil rights, education, criminal justice, healthcare, etc. – and evaluating legislative 
behaviors around those issues (Swain 1993; Tate 2003; 2014; Bratton and Haynie 1999). This approach 
has a number of effects on how we perceive the nature of racialized issues and the results of efforts 
in those areas, as presumptions of a “narrow’, “racialized”, and “contentious” agenda may be the 
function of the selection of the researcher. This process also results in a static understanding of Black 
interest and the resulting behaviors around them. Others explore the dyadic relationships between 
districts and their representatives’ behaviors (Cameron, Epstein, and O’Halloran 1996; Canon 1999; 
Whitby 2000, for example). Here, researchers rest on the assumption that the demographic makeup 
and median preferences of their districts will shape issue support in legislative bodies. This decision 
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moves the scope of inquiry further away from the collective preferences of the caucus and how their 
preferences and worldview shape their activities. 
 While these practices have certainly made tremendous contributions to our understanding of 
the representation of Black interests in legislative bodies, they leave several key questions left 
fundamentally unanswered. First, these practices place little emphasis on the collective preferences of the 
CBC. We are left with little insight into how the caucus identifies, defines, and prioritizes policy issues 
that plague both the constituencies that they represent and nearly half of the African American 
population that is not represented by someone that shares their identity. It also limits our ability to 
speak to how the organization communicates those collective preferences to the institution. This study 
seeks to fill this void by placing and explicit focus on the nature of policy issues, as defined by the 
caucus. It views the caucus as an organization that is more than capable of building a diverse, complex 
agenda and identifying the multiple dimensions that construct these problems in ways that reflect the 
collective will of the organization. 
Second, in attempting to speak to the collective actions of the Congressional Black Caucus, the 
propensity to examine individualized behaviors – or utilize measures that rely on individualized 
behaviors – place a great deal of faith in the powers of aggregation.  Rather than treating the 
organization as an entity within itself, findings that result from the aggregation of voting behaviors 
and bill sponsorships may be two or three degrees removed from the will of the organization. To 
remedy this, I explore the collective actions that result from the establishment of organizational 
features and mechanism or the products of collective action conducted at the behest of the caucus 
with the intent o promote the collective agenda of the caucus onto the institution’s larger legislative 
agenda.  
 
The Collective Behavior of the Congressional Black Caucus 
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Although they are seemingly few in number, nearly every successful story of marginalized 
groups achieving non-incremental policy change in is one that starts with a collective decision to 
accomplish three goals: they organize, strategize, and engage in collective activities to advocate for 
change. The story of the emergence of the Congressional Black Caucus is no different. Any long-term 
solution to legislative inactivity in Black interest issues would require a collective effort to challenge 
the institution-wide conditions that contribute to a strong status quo bias as well as the forces that 
target marginalized groups within the chamber. Such a solution would, in all likelihood, require a 
comprehensive approach to changing the culture of the institution, challenge institutional 
arrangements of power, reshape the perception of the issues, and build support for their legislative 
pursuits.  As you will see, today’s caucus is a story of cohesion, evolution, and collective action aimed 
at driving attention towards issues that shape the lives of their constituencies at home and nationally.  
The ability to organize provides “lawmakers who find themselves unable to exercise power 
through traditional channels” with “a unique source of institutional authority that does not first require 
members to control majoritarian institutions”(Rubin 2017, 299). Through a thorough historical 
analysis, Ruth Bloch Rubin (2017) explores the emergence of intraparty organizations in Building the 
Bloc. She examines how a number of insurgent groups – like the Freedom Caucus, the Tea Party, the 
Blue Dog Coalition, the Republican Progressive Insurgency in the early 1900s – were able to use 
cohesive voting and manipulate procedures to shape legislative outcomes. She convincingly argues:  
 
“Provided they can resolve members’ collective action and coordination problems, organized 
blocs of dissident lawmakers can durably reshape their institutional environment by forcing 
changes to Congress’s internal rules and procedures. They can also disrupt and reconfigure 
national politics by championing or resisting policies that may in turn create new political 
constituencies and sites of political contestation. Intraparty organizations thus provide a 
previously unrecognized stronghold from which legislators – working outside of the party 
cartel, and unsure of whether they are indeed pivotal – may influence legislative outcomes”. 
(Rubin 2017, 299) 
 
 
 
10 
 
Most queries into the impact of increased diversity take an individualized approach to assessing 
the effectiveness of inclusion on the ability to seek out and obtain substantive policy gains for 
marginalized communities. Others explore dyadic relationships between the preferences of those 
communities and the individual legislative behavior of their elected official (Whitby 2000). However, 
the modern Congress is often characterized by decentralized committee power (Aldrich and Rohde 
1997), cartelized leadership (Cox and McCubbins 2005; 2007), and decreased individual power among 
its rank and file members. Additionally, minority members often face structural and interpersonal 
barriers that work against their efforts (Hawkesworth 2003; Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Griffin and 
Keane 2011; Craig et al. 2015). The current institutional setting has proven to be unconducive to 
individual members - of color or otherwise - influencing legislative agendas(Sinclair 2011). This work 
shares the sentiment that, in Congress, collective action - and thus, organization - has become a more 
effective “means by which individuals can more fully realize their individual values” (Arrow 1974, 16). 
Therefore, I place an explicit emphasis on the collective actions and strategies adopted by the 
Congressional Black Caucus. 
 
 
Collective Agenda Setting in the House of Representatives 
Agenda authority is not as cut-and-dry as dominant theories of the legislative process suggests 
it would be, as blocs of lawmakers have been successful in capturing legislative agendas. As Republican 
Paul Ryan (R-WI) discovered in his brief tenure as Speaker, a relatively small bloc of legislators can 
have a dramatic impact on the party’s legislative agenda. Political parties in the twenty-first century are 
coalitions of coalitions, Positive agenda change will likely be the result of inter-coalitional cooperation 
in shared interests.  It has also been shown – through actions on the part of the Freedom Caucus and 
progressive Democrats – that this fragmentation can result in the cooptation of the legislative agenda 
by influential groups. With party fragmentation becoming increasingly pronounced in the post-reform 
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era, majoritarian mandates at an institutional or party level are becoming decreasingly critical to 
influencing legislative agendas.  Minoritarian influence is becoming increasingly possible in the modern 
congressional environment. 
In any case, policy change, first, requires a degree of commitment on the part of policymakers 
and institutions. The most basic measure of commitment is that of attention; scholars argue, in order 
to partake in any activity, one must first devote some level of attention to it (Kahneman 1973; 2003; 
Simon 1994; Spaulding and Simon 1994; B. D. Jones 1994; B. D. Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Sinclair (1986) argues, “the political agenda is probably best conceptualized as roughly pyramidal with 
very few hot issues at the top and an increasing number of less salient issues as one approaches the 
base”. In determining a legislative agenda, policymakers are faced with a series of calculations that 
shape which issues receive their attention - and which ones do not - as well as how much attention 
should be devoted to each issue. Institutional agendas are defined as much by what fails to receive 
attention as which issues are dominant at a given time (Kingdon 2011; Cobb and Elder 1971; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Cobb and Ross 1997; Krutz 2005). I argue throughout this project that 
an institutionalized and perpetual inattentiveness to uniquely-Black issues and conditions lies at the 
root of this lack of substantive gains in these areas. It is inattention that works against policy change 
and preserves the status quo in Black-interest issue areas.  
Institutional inattention to Black interests – brought on by ideological, partisan, and racially-
motivated access problems – remains a persistent barrier to change in Black issues, the next logical 
question is how can Black lawmakers overcome these circumstances to drive attention and initiate 
positive policy change? Successfully challenging the status quo in a non-incremental fashion means 
groups have likely avoided snares throughout the cycle of attention – including in drawing attention 
to societal problems, navigating preventative cost considerations that disrupt the cycle, and preventing 
the eventual decline in attention that typically follows (Downs 1972). It means that advocates have 
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built enough coalitional support and consensus to demand action, have overcome institutional 
inefficiencies in design and operation, and is robust to various arrangements of institutional control. 
Finally, and especially for Black lawmakers in American political institutions, substantive change 
means institutional biases that impact access, processes and outcomes have been challenged or 
changed (Guinier 1991; Hawkesworth 2003; Tate 2014; Tyson 2016). 
Early exploration of the emergence of informal congressional organizations from Susan Webb 
Hammond and colleagues differentiated between national interest – or identity caucuses – and other 
forms of ideological or special interest groups. Identity caucuses, by design, seek to achieve three goals 
that serve their operational purposes within the chamber: (1) to facilitate the gathering of and 
streamline the flow of information to its members, the institution, and their constituencies, (2) to 
develop and forward catered agendas through the formulation of group-specific policy, and (3) to 
examine policy and its potential impact on the constituencies they serve (Hammond, Mulhollan and 
Stevens 1985). It is no surprise then that survey analysis Arturo Vega (1993) confirms the propositions 
of Hammond, et al., finding groups that represent the national interests of shared-identity constituents 
report that their top three primary interests are (1) information gathering, (2) agenda setting, and (3) 
representation.  
I look to reorient the focus of scholarship concerning minority representation to questions 
that ask how issues get voted on. I concentrate on the collective efforts of the Black Caucus to reshape an 
institutional agenda that may be biased against - and deprioritize - racialized policy areas 
(Schattschneider 1975; Polsby 1968; Frymer 2010). In doing so, I engage key processes of agenda 
setting that have been largely absent from minority representation scholarship. This includes questions 
of problem definition (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; B. D. Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner 
and Jones 2015), venue shopping (Schattschneider 1975; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pralle 2003), 
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division of labor (Arrow 1974), and other forms of collective action with the purpose of driving 
legislative attention (B. D. Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013). 
 
A Study of the Evolution of the Congressional Black Caucus 
In examining the collective efforts of the CBC to shape legislative attention, it becomes quite 
evident that the modern iterations of the caucus would be almost unrecognizable to those who penned 
scholarly examinations of the group prior to the 104th Congress. Aside from member turnover and 
the addition of a new generation of more pragmatic, progressive Black lawmakers (Canon 1995; 
Gillespie 2010), the organization underwent a tremendous evolution in their structures, strategies, and 
legislative pursuits.  This study views the collective actions of the collective actions of the caucus as a 
product of interactions between changes in majority control of the House of Representatives and the 
institutional change that followed, political learning, and policy learning. 
 
Institutional Change and the Evolution of Extra-party Behaviors 
The Congressional Black Caucus “enjoyed” Democratic rule for the entirety of the group's 
existence. However, the transition out of a sustained Democratic majority in the House to a durable, 
six-term dominance of House Republicans ultimately reshaped lawmaking within the institution and 
for the Black Caucus. Singh (Singh 1998, 194) chronicles the challenges - and shock - directly 
associated with the new Republican majority in the 104th Congress. Not only were Black members 
relegated to a minority within the minority party for the first time, the organizational agenda, itself, 
appears to have been negatively impacted by the disruptive nature of the reforms associated with the 
Republican's “Contract” reforms. He comments, “the CBC seemed unable to come to a collective 
view of what Blacks' permanent interests were, much less on how best to realize them”. As a result, 
the caucus was faced with a need to revisit its legislative strategy. 
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On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House - led by newly appointed Speaker Newt 
Gingrich - passed sweeping rules changes aimed at increasing transparency, reducing operating costs, 
and reducing legislative inefficiencies perceived to exist prior to the shift in majority control of the 
House. Scholars point to a number of reforms over the years that have directly contributed to the a 
general decline in analytic capacity and decentralization of the House of Representatives (Aldrich and 
Rohde 1997; Schickler 2001; Adler 2002; Rohde 2010; Adler and Wilkerson 2011; Baumgartner and 
Jones 2015). Committee reform had direct and indirect impacts on Black lawmakers that reshaped the 
way the members operate within the chamber. The Gingrich reforms in the 104th, first, eliminated 
several committees-- the Post Office, Merchant and Marine Fisheries, and District of Columbia 
Committees – that here populated by Black lawmakers. Abolishing three committees also means that 
these members - and their demands - would be shuffled to new committees. Following the structural 
changes, the reduction of committees also resulted in a necessary reshuffling of jurisdictions to 
account for the reduction in committee force. In eliminating three committees, Gingrich created 
somewhat of a mess of the jurisdictional arrangement of the House. 
Extra-party activities became even more important after Gingrich-era reforms initiated a 
decline in the analytic capacity of Congress (Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Reform ultimately reduced 
committee staff, defunded external research operations, and destabilized the committee structure. 
Most impactful for the Congressional Black Caucus was the decision to defund and dismantle the 
system of Legislative Service Organizations (LSOs). Analysis from Andrew Clarke found that the 
abolishment greatly decreased the legislative capacity of LSO members and destabilized legislative 
networks (Clarke 2018). “Republican leadership abruptly dismantled a system of directly funded 
political institutions in the 104th Congress, and LSO chairs, accustomed to directing considerable 
resources towards their organization’s legislative agenda, were sent scrambling for alternative financial 
arrangements” (Clarke 2018, 19).  
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This action prompted one of three responses from existing LSO organization that were 
consequentially “demoted” to caucus status. Many organizations collapsed outright.  Clarke (2018, 4) 
argues some “organised blocs of lawmakers have deemphasized their role as research operations and 
constructed new institutions that more effectively appeal to donors and outside groups”. The 
Congressional Black Caucus, on the other hand, remained resilient in the face of reform. According 
to Rep. Owens’ view from the inside, “Instead of destroying the CBC, Gingrich’ decrees had only 
crippled it, forced a creative mutation” (Owens 2011, 207). The caucus devised creative means to 
maintain and fund organizational staff to conform with Gingrich’s mandates. The organization 
redirected their efforts to internalizing many of the practices that were facilitated by institutional 
funding.  
While some organizations outsourced their research operations, the Congressional Black 
Caucus chose to evolve. The caucus shifted their attention towards bolstering their pre-existing 
taskforces and working groups and engaging policy experts and a community of scholars. While 
institutional change disrupted much of the legislative activity in the House of Representatives, these 
reforms ultimately led to an increase in extra-party activity on the part of the Congressional Black 
Caucus. The articles that follow reveal several products of organizational and strategic changes that 
came as a direct result of institutional change.  
 
 
Learning and Extra-Party Activity 
Evolution can also come as political actors undergo “a form of learning that consists of the 
use of experience, or other feedback, either to reaffirm or revise causal reasoning about policies, 
targets, and outcomes” (May 1992, 334). According to public policy literature, learning manifests itself 
in two ways – political and policy learning (Wildavsky 1979; Sabatier 1988; 1991; May 1992; Bennett and 
Howlett 1992; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Soss 1999; Dunlop 2017). The caucus has developed 
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and reinforce multiple mechanism to facilitate both policy and political learning for Black Caucus 
members.   
Political learning, according to Peter May (1992, 339) “entails policy advocates learning about 
strategies for advocating policy ideas or drawing attention to policy problems.” This entails an actor 
or group of actors making “feasibility assessments” of their current advocacy strategies, their 
likelihood of success given their current strategy, and the obstacles that impede their success. The 
information derived from political learning often “provides a basis for formulating new tactics for 
advocating a particular proposal or problem” (May 1992, 339). Wildavsky (1979) argues, trial and error 
can lead to eventual success as long as that a change in behavior results from the failure. Additionally, 
the division of labor into these different committees allows members with either specialization, direct 
interests, or advantageous committee placements in relevant policy areas to use their access and 
expertise to reshape tactics, inform other members, and take the lead in issue advocacy. Policy learning, 
on the other hand, is when policy actors develop a new or reaffirmed understanding of a policy 
domain. This can come  as the result of a shift or competition in an advocacy group’s core belief 
system (Sabatier 1988) or a changes in the social construction of policy problems (Wildavsky 1979; 
May 1992) 
Since their inception in the 1970's, the Caucus has formalized its presence over time by 
organizing into taskforces and working groups that serve as policy laboratories and sources of 
information gathering. The system of taskforces and working groups aid in both political and policy 
learning. First, organizations with the longevity of the CBC - who's members are often characterized 
as electorally secure, increasingly senior, and gaining in institutional influence - have certainly 
improved their understanding of social and political forces impeding their success. In addition, the 
external policy research foundation conducts similar tasks in outreach and engagement with policy 
experts in the various fields of interest. Through these two wings of the organization, the CBC engages 
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a community of academics and specialists to provide expert-based information that has the potential 
to aid in the identification and definition of policy problems and solutions, to fortify the arguments 
of the group, and to reinforce policy images within and across policy coalitions (Weible 2008). Scholars 
argue that representatives of color now rely on the development their  extra-party infrastructure 
designed to aid in the search for collective policy victories in targeted interests (Minta 2011; Minta and 
Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985). Additionally, as policymakers learn 
- either through trial and error or through policy learning - they constantly look to readjust their 
strategy in search of more favorable outcomes. 
 
Progression 
I look to determine (1) what avenues are available for Black lawmakers to overcome inattentiveness 
to Black issues, and (2) how the Congressional Black Caucus works collectively to shift and maintain 
attention on Black interests in the House of Representatives? I theorize that the employment of a 
village approach has improved collective prospects of Black members of Congress. Given this 
expectation, I examine the following three behaviors: 
 
 
Collective Messaging for Shaping Policy Priorities and Images 
In order to solve problems, the institution must first be made aware of the problem through 
environmental signals and information (Cobb and Elder 1971; B. D. Jones and Baumgartner 2005; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2015; Workman, D. Jones, and E. Jochim 2009). What complicates this 
process is that problem definitions are the product of varying and competing perspectives of the event 
and priorities of those perceiving the event. Dawson and Cohen (2002, 495) note, differences in racial 
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identity can be at the root in variations in problem definitions and lead to the undermining of political 
communication: 
“...separate racial groups might have different meanings attached to the same political concepts 
and events. Different racial groups may very well have different rules (or “grammars”) for 
interpreting how political and social phenomena are interpreted and understood. When 
meanings and interpretations of politics are unstable across racial groups, the foundations for 
meaningful political communication is undermined” 
 
We know that those invested in policy outcomes spend a significant portion of their time 
working to expose cleavages within existing structures (Schattschneider 1975) and creating new 
narratives around policies to influence institutional actors and even the mass public (McBeth Mark K. 
et al. 2007; M. D. Jones and McBeth 2010; Shanahan Elizabeth A., Jones Michael D., and McBeth 
Mark K. 2011; M. Jones, Shanahan, and McBeth 2014; Jones Michael D. et al. 2015; Yang 2016). In 
fact, William Riker (1986) argues in the Art of Political Manipulation that a key difference in political 
winners and losers is the ability for actors to combine rhetoric, persuasion, and strategy to shape 
images around particular issue to create more advantageous outcomes. Political winners, Riker argues, 
identify relevant - and potentially manipulatable - actors, invent new actions, orchestrate frames or 
dimensions around potential outcomes, and invent political processes to favor preferred outcomes 
(see also Shepsle 2003). The Congressional Black Caucus has transformed into an organization that 
concentrates its efforts on reshaping the legislative priorities of the Democratic Party by reconfiguring how they 
frame and communicate policy images in order to break through and break down barriers of institutional 
inattention. 
The first of three articles will be dedicated to understanding how the Congressional Black 
Caucus identifies policy problems, defines the conditions that contribute to the problem, and employs 
collective actions to relay messages to the institution. To accomplish this, I will analyze 99 Special 
Order Hour speeches delivered from the 111th through the 114th Congresses. These speeches represent 
more than ten years of collective attempts to communicate the plight of Black Americans and advocate 
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for policy change in a broad range of issues. The Black Caucus has developed practice of conducting 
special order speeches – with the approval of party leadership – as a collective effort to bring attention 
to issues, introduce new information on policy problems gained from internal and external expert 
engagement, and propose policy solutions. It becomes clear that the Congressional Black Caucus has 
come to use Special Order floor speeches to engage in a collective messaging campaign designed to 
advocate for Black interests. 
Scholars interested in the Congressional Black Caucus also point to the notion that the 
contentiousness that surrounds Black issues causes the Democratic Party to shy away from addressing 
them. I find the CBC to use special order speeches to (1) expand the number of issues the caucus 
seeks to draw attention to, (2) expand the dimensions considered for each policy issues, and (3) 
connect dimensions from seeming unrelated dimensions to the problems of Black America to provide 
structure for a complex agenda. 
 
In-Group Support of Black Interests 
 While the first article examines how the CBC identifies, defines and advocates for change in 
Black-interest areas, the second article of this analysis will focus how the organization’s members have 
coalesced around the caucus agenda. Scholars present two competing perspectives of the CBC and its 
members. On one hand, many have pointed out the impressive degree of cohesion that often results 
from their voting behavior (Gile and Jones 1995; Mixon and Ressler 2001; Mixon and Pagels 2007; 
Tate 2014). However, voting as a bloc does not necessarily mean that caucus members are always on 
one accord in all parts of the legislative process. Ideological, generational, and strategic differences 
within the ranks of the caucus could threaten to break down cohesion in messaging and collective 
action designed to promote the caucus agenda (Canon 1995; Gillespie 2010; Tate 2014). 
 To examine in-group support, I apply common tools of social network analysis to explore 
cosponsorship by CBC members from the 103rd to the 110th Congress. I focus exclusively on bills 
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sponsored by CBC members in areas targeted by the Black Caucus to determine if – and ultimately 
how – cohesion has varied over time. I posit, the cohesion of the caucus will be subject to ebbs and 
flows over time. It may very well be the case that the organization resembled more along the lines of 
a “loosely-tied” collective that some have suggested (Barnett 1977; Singh 1998). I find, however, that 
as the organization formalized and crystallized its processes, extra-party behaviors, and agenda, 
Congressional Black Caucus cohesion improved over time.  
In addition, I expect cohesion to be inversely related to the amount of resources available to 
the caucus. More particularly, I find that in Republican majorities, the CBC engaged in a collective 
messaging campaign through bill sponsorship and cosponsorship. As negative agenda-setting sets in, 
and progressive racialized policies are (at best) silenced or (worst) threatened, one of the few tools at 
the Caucus’ disposal will be to make a collective effort to relay messages of cohesion within the 
institution. I find clear evidence that Congressional Black Caucus cohesion improves during 
Republican majorities. 
 
Venue Shopping in the House of Representatives 
 The third article is dedicated to examining how the adoption of multidimensional policy 
definitions impacts the prospects of bill success in the House of Representatives. Multidimensional 
legislation is increasingly becoming a new norm in congressional lawmaking (Davidson, Oleszek, and 
Kephart 1988; Krutz 2000; 2001b; 2001a; Krutz and Cullison 2008). I predict that the Congressional 
Black Caucus will change their sponsorship practices to match this new trend. For members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus, shifting to multidimensional policy definitions lead to an increase in the 
sponsorship of multidimensional proposals. 
 Scholars point to a number of advantages associated with sponsoring multidimensional 
legislation. In designing bills in a way that assures that they land in multiple committees, members may 
be able to build coalitions, circumvent gridlock, and increase attention to Black interests (Krutz 2000; 
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2001b; 2001a). Sponsoring cross-cutting legislation may also allow members to take part in deliberate 
actions aimed at capitalizing on jurisdictional instability that resulted from Gingrich era reforms. King 
(King 1994; 2008) argues, members of Congress seek to exploit instability using bill sponsorships to 
challenge jurisdictional boundaries and take advantage of periods where committees may be more 
susceptible to efforts to expand the reach of the committee (see also Adler 2002; Adler and Wilkerson 
2011). I find it possible that members of the Black Caucus will look to take part in these “turf wars” 
with some degree of success. If this does occur, there may be tangible benefits associated with 
sponsoring multidimensional legislation. I find the Sponsorship of multidimensional legislation 
increased the likelihood that CBC-sponsored bills navigated the legislative process.  
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Chapter 2: From Complexity to Clarity 
A Network Approach to Better Understanding a Collective Black-Interest Agenda 
Periloux C. Peay  and John D. Rackey  
 
 
 
Introduction 
Seminal scholarship on the representation and advancement of Black interests in legislative 
bodies emphasizes the role that descriptive representatives play in shaping discourse surrounding 
group-specific issues. Throughout her classic exploration of the impacts of descriptive representation, 
Jane Mansbridge (1999, 628) asserted that the presence of representatives that share identities with 
marginalized groups “enhances the substantive representation of interests by improving the quality of 
deliberation.” Remedying inequalities rooted in racial and gender differences, she argues, may rely on 
the ability of group members to communicate “uncrystallized issues” to the larger institution. Indeed, 
much of the responsibility to construct definitions of problems that plague Black Americans and 
articulate their policy needs and desires rests on the shoulders of those that share their identity in the 
halls of Congress. The issues that they elect to speak about and the ways that they speak about them 
sheds light on their attention lies and communicates their understanding of their constituency’s 
desires. More importantly, Grimmer displays how members’ communicated – or expressed – agenda 
is closely tied to other legislative behaviors including floor votes and committee placements. Despite 
advancement in understanding of how Black lawmakers behave in legislative bodies, questions of how 
Black lawmakers “speak for” Black America remain largely absent from scholarly discussions 
surrounding Black representation.  
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Many will acknowledge that the plight of Black America represents a complex, entangled web 
of interrelated policy problems. However, the dominant perception of the collective agenda of Black-
interests in the House of Representatives is that it is narrow, racialized, and conflict-inducing (Swain 
1993; Singh 1998; Tate 2003; 2014). The nature of the policy issues that they pursue, some argue, plays 
a part in their perceived ineffectiveness in achieving wholesale policy change. However, those that 
levy these critiques do so with a static, limited concern the nature of policy issues – problems that are 
dynamic, multidimensional, and connected. More importantly, many who study the representation of 
Black interests in Congress do so with little consideration of how the nature of problems in the Black 
community is defined by those charged with promoting those issues.  
The goals of this exploration are two-fold.  First, this study seeks to center the value of political 
discourse by drawing on theoretical presumptions from public policy literature and foundational 
contributions from scholars of descriptive representation to evaluate (1) how Black-interest policy 
problems are constructed by those charged with promoting and representing those interests within 
political institutions, (2) how Black-interest policy problems are connected, and (3) how discourse 
around Black-interest policy problems can shape efforts to solve these issues. We examine the content 
and context of efforts taken by the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) to establish lines of 
communication designed to identify, define, and promote problems in the Black community onto the 
larger institutional agenda. This discourse is both a window into the nature of the complex problems 
that make up their collective expressed agenda in the House and a means to clarify complex issues by 
organizing shared attributes at the core of these problems.   
Along the way, we hope to expand the empirical exploration into the representation of 
marginalized interest in political institutions by drawing on an underutilized methodological approach 
– Social Network Analysis (SNA) – to uncover the examine the nature of the CBC’s collective expressed 
agenda. To accomplish this, we employ a qualitative application of SNA to perform a textual analysis 
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of 99 CBC Special Order Hour Speeches delivered from the 111th – 114th Congress. We argue 
throughout, the network model provides several distinct advantages over traditional modeling: (1) 
network models are designed to account for interconnected issues on the caucus’ agenda, (2) a network 
approach provides a means to organize an otherwise messy agenda, and (3) a network approach is 
designed specifically to evaluate agendas that are comprised of interrelated issues. Given these 
findings, there is an opportunity to shift scholarly discussions towards more direct considerations of 
how discourse shapes our theories and analysis of Black representation. 
 
Identifying and Defining Issues on a Black-interest Agenda 
 Questions centering on the value of racial inclusivity in political institutions have proved 
essential to understanding how the preferences of underrepresented and marginalized communities 
are represented (Pitkin 1967; Barnett 1977; Barnett and Hefner 1976; Canon 1995; 2005; Swain 1993; 
Mansbridge 1999; Whitby 2000; Tate 2003; 2014; Broockman 2013; Tyson 2016, among others).  Black 
representatives draw on intrinsic motivation to work to improve the lives of those with “shared 
experiences” in institutions that have shown themselves, at times, to be indifferent and even hostile 
towards the advancement of Black interests (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Carmines, Huckfeldt, and 
McCurley 1995; Frymer 2010; Hawkesworth 2003; Rocca, Sanchez, and Morin 2011). At their core, 
they have taken on the responsibilities of communicating the needs of their constituencies and acting 
in their best interests through individual and collective action.  
Mansbridge’s (1999) work highlights one importance of Black representation in deliberative 
spaces, arguing descriptive representatives work to improve deliberation surrounding Black interests 
by developing horizontal lines of communication from their positions of political influence. 
Horizontal communication is said to improve the substantive representation of Black interests by 
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articulating “uncrystallized” issues – those that “have not been on the political agenda long, candidates 
have not taken public positions on them, and political parties are not organized around” (Mansbridge 
1999, 643)– to the larger institution. Horizontal communication, according to Mansbridge (1999), 
differs from vertical lines of communication – those that emerge from contacts between 
constituencies and their representatives and shape legislative behaviors such as bill sponsorships, 
cosponsorship, and voting tendencies (Swain 1993; Whitby 2000; Tate 2001; 2003; Pinney and Serra 
2002; Rocca and Sanchez 2008; Tate 2014). While both modes of communication are essential to the 
representation of Black interests, tendencies in the scholarly examination of Black legislative behavior 
suggests the discipline has invested far more into the of understanding the former than the latter.  
National and group-interest caucuses – like the Congressional Black Caucus – typically operate 
in two spaces: agenda-setting – promoting issues onto the institutional agenda – and agenda maintenance – 
keeping issues on the legislative agenda (Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985; Stevens, Mulhollan, 
and Rundquist 1981). Given this, a major responsibility of the caucus must be to take on an active 
role in organizing and defining – or redefining – issues shared amongst members and their 
communities that are otherwise inadequately communicated by out-group representatives 
(Mansbridge 1999; Fenno 1978). Daniel Gillion (2016, 19) contends, “a dialogue on race that takes 
place in government draws attention to racial inequality on the political agenda and informs 
governmental officials and the American public alike of the continuing inequities that persist”.  When 
politicians discuss race it has the potential to shape political processes, institutional agendas, policy 
outcomes, and the public response to questions centered on racial inequality in American (Gillion 
2016). However, we know very little about what these conversations actually look like.  
Katrina Gamble’s examination of participation in committee procedures reveal Black 
lawmakers are more active in than nonwhites in both Black interest areas and – surprisingly – nonracial 
areas. She posits, this increased activity at the committee level suggests Black members “have stronger 
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preference intensities towards black interest bills than do white legislators”, and these differences in 
preferences “translate into significant differences in the representation of policies that 
disproportionately affect black communities” (Gamble 2007, 435). Michael Minta finds (2011, 124) 
minority lawmakers “play an instrumental role in ensuring that federal officials as well as fellow 
congresspersons are enforcing civil rights laws as well as implementing policies that benefit the poor.” 
Relatedly, Black lawmakers are able to shape discourse towards Black interests in committee 
procedures even more when they are in positions of power. Ellis and Wilson (2013, 1214) find, “[t]he 
odds that hearings addressed minority interest policy issues were nearly three times greater when 
African-American, compared to white representatives, chaired committee hearings”. 
Discourse is particularly important for Black lawmakers who are subject interpersonal and 
structural marginalization in other phases of the legislative process (Hawkesworth 2003; Griffin and 
Keane 2011; Frisch and Kelly 2006). Floor speeches provide Black lawmakers with an outlet to 
circumvent access and interpersonal barriers that exist and becomes a platform to articulate to the 
broader institution the Black condition that is free from attempts to silence or marginalize their voices. 
It is clear that Black representatives see a great deal of value in their role in shaping the discourse 
surrounding issues that directly impact communities that share their identity. It is also clear that Black 
lawmakers utilize spaces, such as committee processes, to promote Black interest through deliberative 
means. However, it is less-clear exactly how Black representatives speak about and for Black interests 
when provided the opportunity. This article seeks to build on Mansbridge’s idea of “horizontal 
communication” and Gillion’s theory of Discursive Governance and uncover trends in how Black 
legislators use collective action to discuss, define, and prioritize issues on their agenda. Discourse 
becomes a tool for CBC to promote and pursue the interests of Black America and work to challenge 
dominant images that engulf potentially racialized policy areas. 
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Discourse as a Means of Identifying Issues on Black-interest Agenda 
While an important role of minority representatives is to communicate and promote 
uncrystallized issues, Black lawmakers have traditionally struggled to come to a consensus on how 
those issues should be communicated.  The debate concerning how the “Black agenda” should look 
(what issues should take priority, how broad should the agenda be, etc.) and how the agenda should 
be pursued (pragmatic or militant, racialized or deracialized, etc.) is one that has been at the forefront 
of much of the scholarship, criticism, and intrigue surrounding the Congressional Black Caucus 
(Barnett 1977; Canon 1995; Smith 1996; Johnson and Secret 1996; Singh 1998; Gillespie 2010; Owens 
2011; Tate 2014). For most of their existence, the CBC has wrestled both internally and externally 
with these questions, potentially to their detriment.  
Scholars also grapple with concerns over what constitutes a “Black issue”; these practices 
consistently resurface in traditional approaches to measuring the representation of Black interests.  
Some aim to select an appropriate sample of problems by focusing on known areas of inequity that 
typically results in a consideration of a “usual suspects” lineup of policy issues – education, healthcare, 
criminal justice, civil rights, etc. This process results in analysis that – based on the sheer nature of 
these issues – will result in contentious, racialized politics and will likely yield contentious, racialized 
results, based on a narrow selection of policy issues. Others examine dyadic relationships between a 
member and their constituency. While this approach fulfils one of Mansbridge’s core functions of 
descriptive representation, vertical communication, it does little to satisfy the horizontal 
communicative mode of representation. Dyadic relationships also fail to adequately capture a policy 
environment where Blacks in Congress endure a sort of institutional triple-consciousness. Black 
representatives advocate not only for their respective districts, they also the more than 50 million 
Black Americans that aren’t represented by someone that shares their identity.   
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 Discourse provides Black lawmakers the opportunity to take part in attention-shifting 
behaviors – an activity Baumgartner and Jones call “issue intrusion” (Jones and Baumgartner 2005). 
Black representatives are tasked with promoting issues that “not been on the political agenda long, 
candidates have not taken public positions on them, and political parties are not organized around 
them” (Mansbridge 1999, 643). The first step of issue promotion is to identify the central problems 
on their agenda and communicate to the institution. In doing so, we expect the Caucus to expand the 
scope of problems that could – and should – be considered tied to the condition of Black America. 
We anticipate the organization to concert a considerable amount of time – and collective effort – to 
discussing issues that are routinely included among “Black issues” and less conventional policy 
problems. 
Problem definition plays an essential role in influencing agenda setting and policy solution 
adoption (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; 2002; Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017, among others). The ways in which problems are defined 
also provides policy actors the means to broaden or constrict the scope of conflict in order to build 
interest in problems that persist for Black America (Schattschneider 1975; Workman, Shafran, and 
Bark 2017). We also expect Black lawmakers to see the value in defining policy issues in a way that 
communicates their preferred issue constructs by defining the issues according to their underlying 
attributes. Finally, we expect to uncover that discourse provides information that could prove useful 
to policy actors and scholars interested in the representation of Black interests. First, discourse 
becomes a tool for policymakers and researchers to organize a vast and complex agenda according to 
their shared attributes. Discourse is also a source of information that can be used to assess the 
complexity of current state of Black-interest policy problems. Lastly, political discourse has the 
potential to shed light on various plans of action to best solve problems in the Black community. 
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Hours of Power: CBC Special Order Speeches  
Over the past two decades, the Congressional Black Caucus has engaged in a messaging 
campaign designed to reshape images of problems that plague the Black community and the nation. 
As Figure 1 reveals, two trends are immediately uncovered when evaluating the frequency and 
substance of these speeches. First, the CBC has become increasingly reliant on these speeches as a 
messaging tool. The bulk of special order speeches have been delivered in the most recent decade, 
with 113 of the 139 speeches coming after the 110th Congress. Effectively, the caucus shifted from 
delivering one to two speeches per congressional term to delivering one to two speeches per month. 
More importantly, the caucus appears to have adopted a new purpose for these speeches. Originally, 
these speeches were largely used as a means to discuss the CBC’s alternative budget. For example, in 
the 106th Congress, three of the Caucus’ five special order speeches were centered around the group’s 
budget proposals. However, increasingly these speeches have become a means and opportunity to 
discuss, at great detail, the wide range of policy problems facing Black America and the American 
people, broadly. This brings us to our second departure from the Bayesian hierarchical approach to 
extracting an expressed agenda. 
 
Figure 1: The figure above depicts the number of speeches delivered in each of the congressional terms of interest. 
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To examine the Congressional Black Caucus’ collective effort to use discourse to shape 
constructs around Black interests, we use a qualitative form of  social network analysis to explore the 
contents of 99 speeches delivered on the floor of the U.S. House of Representatives from the 111th 
through the 114th Congresses (2009 – 2016). We focus our attention on those four terms for two 
primary reasons. The first reason is recency; we are primarily interested in how the Black Caucus 
identifies and defines issues that are currently on their legislative agenda. The second motivation (and 
advantage) of this sample is the fact that this period happens to cover the widest breadth of policy 
topics.  
 
A Network Approach to Approximating an Expressed Collective Agenda  
Grimmer’s (2010) efforts in using text to unveil the legislative priorities of Senators resulted 
in a Bayesian hierarchical model that ties lawmaker to statements made in press releases. He then 
validates this approximation of their priorities by tying their individuals expressed agenda to a number 
of legislative behaviors. He convincingly highlights how lawmakers’ dialogue (in this instance written 
texts) can reveal their priorities and serve as windows into their individual home styles. This article 
attempts to provide an alternative approach to arrive a similar concept of an expressed agenda. The CBC 
special order speeches provide insight into the policy priorities of the caucus in ways that may not be 
visible in other phases of the legislative process.  
A network analysis approach to constructing an expressed agenda provides a number of 
similar benefits to Grimmer’s hierarchical model. Ultimately, they both seek to connect actors (or 
groups, in this instance) to statements, positions, or issues. An actor-based network approach has the 
potential to provide the added benefit of revealing how actors are connected to other actors by shared 
interests (Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Leifeld 2013; 2016; Ingold, Fischer, and Cairney 2017). In this 
analysis, specifically, the network approach takes two key departures from Grimmer’s work. First, this 
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analysis looks to move beyond making connections between individuals and their expressed agenda 
and, instead, looks to approximate a collective expressed agenda. The second departure comes in the fact 
that this is an issue-based analysis as opposed to an actor-based exploration.  
It is necessary that we expand on each of these departures and how this analysis seeks to 
accomplish both goals. While Grimmer and others (Mayhew 1974; Fenno 1978; Sulkin 2005) sought 
to reveal where lawmakers elect to dedicate their attention through various forms of communication, 
few have ventured into studying how collections of lawmakers outside of the traditional party 
apparatus communicate their legislative priorities; this is especially the case for collections of 
lawmakers from marginalized and minoritized populations. Many attempts to gauge the effects of 
Black representation – while convincing – often do so by resting on the powers of aggregation of 
individualized behaviors (Gile and Jones 1995; Levy and Stoudinger 1976; Singh 1998; Pinney and 
Serra 1999; Mixon and Pagels 2007; Tate 2014). Floor votes, ideology scores, interest group ratings, 
and even bill sponsorships become convoluted proxies for many of the important – yet empirically 
evasive – concepts they seek to capture like “coordination”, “cohesion”, and “messaging”. CBC 
Special Order speeches represent a consensus-driven, collective effort to identify, construct, and 
promote issues onto a legislative agenda. It is crucial that there exists a means to separate the individual 
preferences of lawmakers from those of a collection of lawmakers that aren’t entirely dependent on 
the powers of aggregation. 
CBC Special Order speeches are true measures of the organization’s collective agenda evident 
in both delivery and in the organizational structure that birthed the practice. First, the special order 
speeches are delivered as a collective as opposed to those delivered by individual lawmakers – with 
many of the more recent speeches calling on the presence of a half-dozen or more of its members 
working in tandem within the one-hour time allotment. In fact, there are a number of occasions where 
individual members of the Black Caucus will deliver an individual floor speech and, in the same 
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legislative session, will return later to join the collective efforts of the caucus in delivering their speech 
of the day.  
Not only are these speeches delivered as a collective unit, these speeches are delivered on behalf 
of the caucus (as opposed to individual members).  This is an important distinction, considering the 
fact that the organization’s bylaws forbid its members from speaking for the caucus without prior 
authorization. This is a privilege typically reserved for the CBC chairperson. This means when 
members gather during CBC Special Order speeches, they are doing so at the behest of the 
organization with the intent relay to the institution and the American people their collective legislative 
priorities and preferences. Additionally, the speeches are often guided or reinforced by other 
organizational features of the caucus. For example, the speakers often reference and draw on work 
performed in the organizations’ taskforces and working groups – a system designed to supplement 
the institutions committee structure as a source of policy-relevant information (Hammond, Mulhollan, 
and Stevens 1985; Owens 2011; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013). Also, the speeches can be linked 
to the short form agenda that the caucus publishes on their organizational website before each term. 
While the organization’s written agenda provides an outline for their legislative priorities, if falls short 
in explaining how the organization constructs these issues. It is these features that reinforce our 
assertion that these are not speeches delivered by individual lawmakers – a significant departure from 
Grimmer’s work dedicated to uncovering expressed agendas. These are an expression of the 
organization’s collective preferences and priorities, and thus they should not be treated as such.  
 
An Issue-centric Approach to Examining an Expressed Agenda 
While previous efforts succeeded in identifying the issues that individual lawmakers 
communicate to their constituency. It falls just short in addressing a more interesting – and potentially, 
more important question. How do members perceive the issues that they choose to promote? A 
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network approach provides added dimension in that it may come closer to answering not only how 
member (or in this case, organizations) prioritize issues on their agenda but, also, how they construct 
the issues that they devote their attention to.  Moreover, it provides insight into how problems on an 
agenda are related to one another. If policy problems are a sum of their many underlying attributes, 
the reality is that many issues share attributes – a process visualized in Figure 2. This idea of issue 
interconnectedness is captured in the ways members discuss policy problems in the speeches, 
themselves. For example, in the 114th Congress, Rep. Donald Payne (D-NJ) argues the multiplicity 
and interconnected nature of health care to related issue areas complicates problems solving: 
 
“There are numerous factors that contribute to the health disparities throughout New Jersey’s 
10th Congressional District and throughout our Nation as well - poverty, environmental 
threats, inadequate access to health care, and educational inequities. These are such 
interconnected issues that a piecemeal plan to fixing the problem will not work. A 
comprehensive approach - one that focuses on providing access to quality care for all, creating 
good jobs that provide a decent living, and increasing educational opportunities for low 
income communities - is only one way to eliminate the health disparities once and for all.” 
 
 
Figure 2: A visualization of the issue based network model 
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Coding and Analyzing CBC Special Order Hour Speeches 
Given the aim of this study, we employ a qualitative approach to Social Network Analysis to 
uncover how Black lawmakers use collectively organized floor speeches to define Black interests. 
Discourse Network Analysis (DNA) is a tool created by Philip Leifeld (2013) to facilitate the 
transformation of textual data into networks. Once constructed, these networks can then be used to 
examine agreement or disagreement between actors in a given policy space and trace conceptual trends 
that emerge in policy debates (Leifeld and Haunss 2012; Leifeld 2013; 2016). To capture the ways in 
which the CBC discusses and defines policy issues, we draw upon a coding scheme devised by the 
Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) (2017). This scheme has been utilized to examine the contexts 
of bill sponsorships, congressional hearings, executive actions, judicial activities and numerous other 
political behaviors in the United States and internationally. The coding scheme organizes these 
behaviors by establishing twenty (20) well-articulated, mutually exclusive major policy topics areas and 
220 minor topic areas that are encapsulated within their respective main topic areas. This approach 
provides for both a broad categorization as well as a more granular classification of policy contexts in 
a given text. We adhere to this coding scheme throughout our coding of the Special Order speeches. 
We acquired official transcripts of each speech delivered during our time period of study 
directly from the Congressional Record. Speeches were then uploaded into Leifeld’s Discourse Network 
Analyzer software and hand-coded by the authors. As Figure 1 indicates, the Caucus delivered 28 
speeches that were less about substantive policy and more about symbolic and ceremonial gestures. 
Examples such speeches include those delivered to honor a deceased member of the caucus or civil 
rights icons or others, i.e. in the 114th Congress, where the CBC delivered a speech on “The History 
of the Congressional Black Caucus” and another on “Confederate Monuments”. From this point, we 
focus our attention on the remaining 71 speeches. In nearly every case, the speeches aligned with the 
following description: (1) speeches were organized to bring attention to a substantive policy problem 
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(voting rights, criminal justice, poverty, etc.), (2) the topics of the speech aligned with a specific major 
and minor topic code in the CAP coding scheme, (3) in each case, multiple lawmakers collaborated in 
the delivery of the speech, and (4) the speeches were organized by the Congressional Black Caucus 
and sanctioned by Speaker of the House according to the rules governing special order speeches.  
We begin by identifying the overarching theme of the speech in question according to the 
CAP major and minor coding scheme. These themes represent a set of policy problems P as outlined 
by the caucus across the entirety of the corpus of speeches where P = {p1, p2, … pm}. In most cases, 
this process was straightforward.i In each case, the overarching theme of the speech remained constant 
throughout the coding of that particular transcript. From there, we proceeded with coding the spoken 
text found in the transcript. To accomplish this, we focused our attention on the attributes used to 
define a particular policy issues by establishing causal relationships with the policy theme. In this 
analysis causal relationships can be drawn by a speaker’s effort to connect a problem to a root cause 
or through the advocacy for a particular solution in a manner that infers a causal relationship between 
the dimension and the overarching problem. We only include attributes that were mentioned at least 
twice in conjunction with a particular policy area to limit the inclusion of attributes that may be the 
result of casual mentions of unrelated policy areas. These attributes in across the breath of speeches 
can be denoted as A = {a1, a2, … am}.ii 
Analysis of special order speeches delivered by the Congressional Black Caucus reveal a complex 
agenda comprised of multidimensional and interconnected problems. The discourse that emerges from these 
speeches reveal the Congressional Black Caucus spends a considerable amount of time constructing 
issues on their legislative agenda by identifying problems in the Black community (and nationally) and 
defining these issues according to their underlying attributes, As Table 1 reveals, CBC members 
covered twenty-seven unique core policy problems in their 71 policy-centered speeches over 4 years. 
Contrary to suggestions that the Black Caucus agenda is narrow, the Black Caucus discussed broad 
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range of diverse policy interests. Not only does the Caucus use collective action to discover and dissect 
an impressive range of policy issues on the House floor, by defining they also illuminate the 
complexities of the issues that plague the Black community. 
Table 1 presents a count of the total undirected connections created in the network of core 
policy problems and the policy attributes used to define those problems. The twenty-seven core 
problems were connected to 115 unique policy-related subtopics. Examiners of Black representation 
often contend that the legislative pursuits of take on unidimensional qualities (Swain 1993; Singh 1998; 
Tate 2003; Canon 1995; 2005, among others). However, Special Order speeches reveal more of a 
network of issues that are connected by their underlying attributes. 
Table 1: Contents of CBC Special Order Hour Speeches Delivered from the 111th through the 114th Congress (2009 – 2018) 
Policy Domain Major Topic Area (CAP) Speeches Attributes 
National Budget  Macroeconomics 4 38 
Macroeconomics  Macroeconomics 7 25 
Unemployment Rate  Macroeconomics 4 19 
Gender & Sexual Orientation Discrimination  Civil Rights and Liberties 4 20 
Voting Rights  Civil Rights and Liberties 10 16 
Minority Issues  Civil Rights and Liberties 1 9 
Civil Rights and Liberties  Civil Rights and Liberties 1 12 
General Health  Health 3 20 
Health Care Reform  Health 7 24 
Labor and Employment  Labor and Employment 2 17 
Employee Benefits  Labor and Employment 2 10 
Employment Training & Workforce Development  Labor and Employment 1 7 
General Education Education 1 3 
Higher Education  Education 1 5 
Air Pollution  Environment 1 5 
Immigration & Refugee Issues  Immigration 2 5 
General Law, Crime, Family Issues  Law, Crime, Family Issues 2 15 
Police, Fire, & Weapons Control  Law, Crime, Family Issues 5 12 
Poverty Assistance  Social Welfare 3 27 
Elderly Issues  Social Welfare 1 4 
Food Assistance Programs  Social Welfare 1 3 
Small Business  Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 1 5 
Financial Institution Regulation  Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 1 2 
Mortgages Banking, Finance, and Domestic Commerce 1 3 
Nominations & Appointments  Government Operations 2 10 
U. S.  Foreign Aid  Int. Affairs & Foreign Aid 2 6 
Int. Affairs & Foreign Aid Int. Affairs & Foreign Aid 1 4 
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The Utility of a Network Modeling of a Collective Expressed Agenda 
 What, if anything, is there to be gained from the efforts on the part of Black lawmakers to 
identify and define issues on their legislative agenda? We argue, there are palpable benefits to engaging 
in, consuming, and considering political discourse for both policymakers and observers interested in 
the representation of Black-interest policies. The preceding section revealed a modern Black-interest 
agenda that is far more broad, multidimensional, and interconnected than most early examinations of 
Black representation would suggest. Outside of providing a better understanding of the nature of the 
issues on the Black Caucus agenda as constructed by the organization, we find that speeches could 
yield strategic information to assist in representing and studying Black-interests. In line with much of 
the policy literature, we view an overarching policy problem as a sum of its underlying attributes. While 
our corpus includes speeches from the 111th to the 114th Congresses, we are not particularly interested 
in the change of definitions over time. Therefore, we elect to treat this series of speeches as a pooled 
cross-section of collective behavior captured in the affiliation matrix where edges are established 
between core policy problems P and their attributes A (Figure 2).  
Using three common tools of social network analysis – community detection, network 
robustness assessments, and node-removal - we find that information derived from political discourse 
provides (1) a means to provide structure to an otherwise disjointed agenda, (2) a means to organize 
an agenda according to shared issue attributes, and (3) a means to assess the complexity of the CBC 
agenda. Before we proceed, we must address the bipartite nature of the graph represented in Figure 
2. To date, bipartite networks have proven to be restrictive in terms of the types of analysis that can 
be run. Given this, we elect to use a monopartite problem-to-problem projection of the underlying 
bipartite network where nodes represent the core problems P discussed in Special Order Hour 
speeches and edges are created when two problems share attributes. The resulting graph is presented 
in Figure 3. 
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Advantage 1: Accounting for the Interconnected Nature of Black-Interests 
 One of the greatest shortfalls of more traditional approaches that engage the representation 
of Black-interest is that they often fail to account for the interconnected nature of problems that 
plague Black America. Educational inequality contributes to a lack of job opportunities. Joblessness 
perpetuates poverty in those same communities, and poverty exacerbates educational inequalities. 
Problems in Black communities are transitive, cyclical, and self-reinforcing. The discourse that arises 
from special order speeches suggest that the collective expressed agenda of the CBC is cultivated with 
that in mind. Unfortunately, existing scholarship struggles to account for this reality. This is not to say 
that scholars that have taken on the challenge of chronicling the struggles associated with representing 
Black interests fail to understand and acknowledge the interconnectivity associated with Black-
interests – most certainly do. However, dominant empirical (quantitative) methods are not necessarily 
designed to account for relational data that would emerge if the context from their collective agenda 
was incorporated into their modeling. 
 
Figure 3: A monopartite projection of the CBC-interest network where nodes represent core problems and edges represent shared attributes. 
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An interconnected collective expressed agenda means that not only means that the problems 
they seek to eradicate are inseparable, but the potential solutions to those problems are also 
interrelated. Just as education inequality has direct linkages to unemployment and poverty, efforts to 
improve access to a quality education can not only break the chain but actually improve employment 
and income for those that need it the most. Statistical modeling, however, often requires us to treat 
these conditions as independent of one another. Endogeneity is problematic in the world of traditional 
models. However, network models are designed, specifically, to account for and even explain 
endogenous effects. Our understanding of the collective efforts to advance the Black American 
condition would be improved greatly by the ability to both provide structure to the web of related 
issues and draw on models designed with the intent of factoring in that interconnectedness – 
conditions only met with a network application.  
 
Advantage 2: Organizing Issues on a Black-interest Agenda 
If taken on their own, the issues on the CBC agenda appear to be rather disjointed. However, 
as we have discussed, and as discourse has pointed out, issues on the CBC agenda share underlying 
attributes in a way that could create families, or clusters, of interrelated issues. We present a community 
detection algorithm – Optimal Community Structure – to detect if such a clustering exists and what the 
nature of that clustering is. Optimal Community Structure is a hierarchical detection algorithm that 
seeks to optimize modularity in a given network.iii  The interpretation of the community detection 
algorithm presented in Figure 4 is straightforward: those nodes that are included in a respective 
community are considered to be more closely related than those in other communities. The results of 
the community detection analysis reinforce the notion that issues can be organized accorded to their 
shared attributes.  
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Figure 4: Issue clustering as determined by the Optimal Community Structure algorithm 
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Advantage 3: Assessing a Collective Expressed Agenda 
 A network approach is also a means to provide different ways to evaluate the collective 
expressed agenda in ways that traditional models fall short. First, there are avenues to test the degree 
of complexity – or robustness – of the collection problems outlined by the Black Caucus. Simple 
systems tend to fragment as nodes are removed from the network, while complex systems are less to 
prone to disruption (Barabási 2016). Discourse becomes a means to assess the complexity of an agenda 
by determining how vulnerable it is to problem-solving efforts. Here, we examine the robustness of 
the CBC problem network by determining the number of nodes that could be removed at random 
before the network collapses. 
 The monopartite projection of the CBC issue network is an impressively dense (connected) 
one. The 241 edges between each of the 27 nodes constitute 68.7% of all potential connections. One 
determinant of a network’s complexity comes with the presence of a “giant component”. A verified 
Malloy-Reed criterion indicates giant component exists in the case that each node (in this instance, 
problem) is connected to at least two other nodes on average. In other terms: 
 ! = #$%&#$& 	> 		2  ( 1 ) 
 
In the case of the CBC issue network, the average node degree 17.85 certainly meets the Malloy-Reed 
criterion. From there, we are able to move forward with determining the critical threshold *+ of nodes 
that can be removed before the structure collapses. This threshold can be calculated: 
 *	+ 	= 		1 −	 ./0%1/01 2.  ( 2 ) 
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More importantly, a network approach can provide insights into if – and how much – progress 
has been made in dismantling the network of policy problems that make up their collective expressed 
agenda. To further illuminate this, I offer a thought experiment motivated by the Caucus’ expressed 
agenda. Network scientists have devised a means to evaluating how vulnerable the network is to 
changes in the structure (Barabási 2016). Interconnectedness has the potential to lead to vulnerabilities 
in some networks – i.e. power grids, the internet, the stock market – or reinforce structures in other 
networks– like social groups. A networks robustness – or complexity – can often be the difference 
between the two. Imagine, for example, a government’s targeting of a terrorist network. A network 
modeling of the actors in that network - and a mapping of their connections to other actors in the 
same network (or, even other networks) – is often the tool of choice to predict network collapse. In 
other words, network model are designed to identify central figures in a network and determine what 
the impact of the node elimination would be on the remaining structure. 
 In regards to the expressed CBC agenda, if node removal simulates problem solving, and 
network failure would suggest that each of these interconnected problems have been remedied, failure 
could actually yield positive outcomes for the communities that they represent. However, the critical 
threshold of node removal suggests that the network of problems on the CBC agenda are reinforced 
by their shared attributes. The resulting critical threshold of the issue network suggests random 
problem-solving require that 94% of the issues (nodes) would need to be removed before the structure 
is no longer viable. While solving problems at random would yield very little impact to the overall 
condition of Black America, how would the network fare against a more targeted attack of issues on 
their agenda? As seen with certain terrorist organization, robust networks are often able to absorb 
significant random losses with little impact on the larger structure of the group. However, targeting 
key figures in the organization – leadership, brokers, etc. – can often cause even the most robust 
networks to collapse at a significantly faster rate. 
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To that point, Figure 5 presents the CBC’s expressed agenda network’s response to two 
different types of attacks. We, first, perform 100 simulations of the effects of attacks based on 
randomized node-removal. The second simulated attack would target the most connected issues 
according to their degree centrality measure. Figure 5 suggest that a better understanding of issues, their 
underlying attributes, and their relationship to other issues – brought on only by a network modeling 
of the collective discourse found in special order speeches – has the potential to illuminate a path 
towards solving problems in Black America. Solving the most connected issues according to their 
degree centrality score would result in issue-network decay much sooner than if issues were selected 
at random. Admittedly the loss of connectivity that comes as a result of various attacks is not very 
impressive. This is a function of the robustness of the problem network. However, if the problem 
network collapses after the random removal of 94% of nodes, targeting nodes with the highest degree 
centrality reduces the estimated point of total collapse to just over 81% when nodes are targeted in 
am more systematic fashion.  
 
Figure 5: Assessment of network vulnerability to various forms of attack 
 
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
1.
0
Vulnerability of the CBC-interest to Targeted Issue Attack
Proportion of Nodes Removed
C
on
ne
ct
iv
ity
 L
os
s
Attack Type
Random
Degree
 53 
To put this in context, the most connected issues are labor and employment, budgetary 
spending, and the unemployment rate. Each of these issues share attributes with twenty-five other 
issues discussed in special order speeches.  Solving those three issues would result in the loss of nearly 
28% of the connectivity of the CBC-issue network. Solving three issues at random would result in a 
connectivity loss of 24%. Solving the next most connected issues – income inequality and poverty – 
would result in a disconnect of 40% of the network (compared to 34% connectivity loss for the next 
two randomly selected issues. The robustness of the CBC problem network presents challenges for 
those attempting to solve problems on their agenda. However, using discourse to gain an 
understanding of the nature of problems on the CBC agenda, we find that network analysis can 
provide useful information to illuminate a clearer path for policymakers. 
 
Discussion 
Scholarly examinations of the representative functions of Black lawmakers have certainly been 
fruitful in framing their behaviors in the halls of Congress. However, by leaning into behaviors such 
as voting and bill sponsorship, we have undersold the importance of politicians engaging in an 
informative dialogue on race-centric policies. In fact, some demote these conversations as 
performative or merely a symbolic form of representation (May 1991; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 
2006). Legislative speech, in this case Special Order speeches, often gets characterized as “cheap talk” 
by scholars because it is often unclear who is listening and what the purpose of this aspect of 
congressional business contributes to outcomes. Meanwhile, other legislative behaviors are seen as 
more tangible measures of representation despite the fact that most, too, routinely fall on deaf ears. 
For example, while bill sponsorships could certainly be viewed as an attempt on the part of lawmakers 
to relay messages to the institution (Schiller 1995; Pinney and Serra 2002; Talbert and Potoski 2002), 
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an overwhelming majority – in most congresses, nearly ninety-percent – of bills never receive attention 
in a meaningful way (Krutz 2005). However, just as with bill sponsorship, legislative speech has 
palpable benefits that extend well beyond their more obvious functions.  
Many of the predominant approaches to examining the behavior of lawmakers from 
underrepresented populations result in a limited understanding of agenda- setting behavior that may 
not properly reflect the true breadth of policy interests. Additionally, in many instances, the analysis 
lacks the necessary systematic consideration of the members’ construction of the issues in question. 
More importantly, common approaches result in a static conception of Black interests – one that does 
not account for the evolution of Black representatives, evolutions in the policy environment, or an 
evolution in the collective strategy to promote and solve those problems at an institutional level. 
Finally, the dominant methods of examining issues fall short in revealing the complexity of the Black 
legislative agenda in Congress.  
As Gillion (2016, 154) convincingly argues, “the dialogue on race emerges not as a symbolic 
gesture but rather a substantive form of governance that constantly enriches the political debate 
among politicians, shapes the creation and reception of public policy, and influences public 
deliberation and cultural norms in the minority community”. In this instance and others, “talking 
about it” is actually “being about it”. In the absence of these conversations, the responsibility of shaping 
policy in Black-interest areas falls on an uninformed, uninterested, and uninspired institution. Floor 
speeches play an essential role in allowing leadership to assess the mood of the rank-and-file, create 
signals to administrative agencies and the courts about legislative intent, and allow members to 
position take and credit claim to serve their reelection goals (Oleszek et al. 2016; Fenno 1973; Mayhew 
1974). Legislative speechmaking allows members to effectively communicate to other elites, 
particularly interest groups, that a member is credibly committed to the interests of that group (Ray 
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2018). Additionally, a legislator’s speechmaking behavior is tied to their representation (home) style 
(Hill and Hurley 2002, 219-220).  
Gillion’s  (2016, 14) theory of discursive governance contends, “the path to ameliorating these 
inequalities begin with politicians’ willingness to engage in a conversation”. It is our hope that, through 
the examination of these CBC Special Order Hour Speeches, we have illuminated the value of 
engaging with the content and context of these conversations around race and their potential value 
for both researchers and policymakers, alike. Political discourse assists defining policy interests in a 
way that highlights breadth and complexity of the organization’s agenda while providing structure and 
organization to such a complex collective of issues. This collective effort to bring issues of race to the 
forefront of discussions in political institutions – through issue promotion and problem definition – 
facilitate their roles as agenda-setters, information brokers, and coalition builders (Stevens, Mulhollan, 
and Rundquist 1981; Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985; Vega 1993). It is crucial that those 
interested in expanding the understanding of Black representation consider the contexts surrounding 
how Black politicians talk about race. Relatedly, it would be prudent to revisit evaluations of the 
Congressional Black Caucus that paint the group as largely ineffective. To the contrary, their role in 
shaping the informative discourse is essential to both forwarding race-centric policies in political 
institutions and shaping public perceptions of the Black experience in America. Further, speeches like 
these shed light on the legislative priorities of the caucus, how they frame the problems that lie at the 
core of the Black-American condition, and the collective strategy that they employ to draw attention 
to and overcome the conditions that create racial inequality.  
The second motivation of this essay was to, hopefully, broaden the consideration of an 
otherwise underutilized method – Social Network Analysis – as a viable and potentially exciting means 
to examine the representation of marginalized interests in political institutions. The CBC special order 
speeches served as an ideal medium to reveal the potential of a network application. However, it is 
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certainly not the only means to either examining the legislative behavior of marginalized groups or 
approximating an expressed legislative agenda. Several scholars have employed actor-based modes 
network analysis to examine bill cosponsorship (Fowler 2006; Bratton and Rouse 2011; 2011; Craig et 
al. 2015) and collaborations in writing “dear colleague” letters in the House (Box-Steffensmeier, 
Christenson, and Craig 2019). However, few have drawn on this form of modeling to examine the 
impacts of racial identity or racialized groups within the institution. It is our hope that this venture 
serves as a steppingstone for those seeking to build on the collective understanding of group 
representation.  
Further, this issue-based approach is unique in the sense that it departs from the more 
traditional actor-based models. Using the Congressional Black Caucus special order speeches as a 
empirical backdrop, we hope that we have revealed that issues can become the center of examination 
as we look to improve our understanding and contextualization of policy problems in American 
politics. This exercise could certainly be extended to examine the differences and overlap between 
various collectives of lawmakers, given the conditions of exclusivity are met. In the case of special 
order speeches, there is little evidence that other groups participate in a similar fashion, especially not 
to the degree that the Black Caucus has relied on floor speeches as a central means of communicating 
their collective agenda. However there are other means of collective communication that could serve 
as a well-reasoned platform to examine expressed agendas. This could also provide a means of 
examining the differences between the expressed collective agendas and the expressed agendas of the 
individual members that comprise the organizations.  
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Chapter 3: Legislative Venue Shopping and the Strategic Pursuit of 
Black Interests in the U.S. House of Representatives 
 
Introduction 
“When legislation is actually considered by a number of committees, multiple perspectives are brought to bear 
on complex problems. More interests have a voice and a more diverse group of members a say at the committee 
stage, where it matters the most.” - Barbara Sinclair in Unorthodox Lawmaking, 2016 
In May of 2018, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) introduced a 1,300-page omnibus 
package to the House of Representatives. This complex, cross-cutting piece of legislation titled the 
Jobs and Justice Act - spanned more than a half-dozen major policy topic areas and, if taken up, would 
have demanded, and likely garnered, the attention of nearly every committee in the chamber. 
Understandably, in a Republican-controlled Congress, the bill stalled almost immediately after 
introduction. However, their efforts speak to a larger and increasingly relevant trend among black 
legislators - and within the House as a whole - of sponsoring multidimensional legislation 
(Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985; Krutz 2001b; Krutz 2005; Krutz 2000; Sinclair 2011). 
This study proposes that such efforts are the product of an institutional evolution in rules and 
structure that facilitates such actions and that Black members have adapted their tactics in hopes 
of increasing their success within the chamber. 
The success of actors within lawmaking bodies often rests in their ability to adapt to, and 
capitalize on, ever-changing political and institutional conditions (Sabatier 1988; Bennett and 
Howlett 1992; May 1992; Pralle 2003). The U.S. House has certainly undergone a great deal of 
changes in recent decades that have fundamentally altered the structure and functional capacity of 
the chamber. Moreover, as Carol Swain (1993; 44) noted more than two decades ago, Black 
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representatives are far removed from the days when the approach to legislating was to “simply 
drop their bills into the hopper [...] and pray for action”; instead, they call on a multitude of 
strategies to seek out success in their collective and individual goals. In the years since, this is 
becoming increasingly true; however, scholarly attention to the strategic nature of Black legislative 
activities remains scarce and underdeveloped. While a new generation of scholars have taken up 
the mantel of examining minority representation in lawmaking bodies, there remains unanswered 
questions concerning (1) not if, but how Black representatives pursue their agenda in Congress and 
(2) if and how circumstances have improved since the the late twentieth century. Inspired by the 
likes of Minta, Gamble, Sinclair-Chapman, and others that have devoted attention to the process, 
I build on their advancements of the literature by, too, looking beyond voting behavior by focusing 
on how a shift in legislative strategy can alter outcomes in the chamber. 
Key studies of the bill referral process in the House of Representatives generally settle on 
the idea that simplicity is advantageous - that bills that are referred to multiple committees fare 
worse when it comes to navigating the legislative process (Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988; 
Young and Cooper 1993; Davidson 1989; Krutz and Cullison 2008). Multiple referrals are thought 
to increase the number of potential veto points, contribute to the decentralized nature of House 
decision making, and induce conflict between committees. However, as Davidson, Oleszek, and 
Kephart (1988; 25) point out, the prospects for such a strategy “vary widely according to the subject 
matter and the committees involved”. Through venue shopping, Black lawmakers may be able to 
capitalize on ever-evolving committee jurisdictions, institutional restructuring, and increasingly 
favorable committee assignments in the chamber and leverage them into more favorable outcomes. 
Black issues, in particular, may require multiple referrals to provide more opportunities for bill 
advancement, break down inherent institutional biases, and build support among potential allies. 
With that in mind, I seek to determine if, for Black members of Congress, sponsoring 
legislation that receives multiple committee referrals results in more favorable outcomes. In doing 
so, I draw on elements of institutional and policy process research to further explore the 
relationship between their efforts to sponsor multidimensional legislation and the institution’s 
capacity to process cross-cutting proposals. I examine substantive bills sponsored by Black 
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members of the House of Representatives in the 103rd, 110th, and 111th Congress in an effort to 
gain insight as to the ramifications of creating policy proposals that span across multiple committee 
jurisdictions. I find that when Black lawmakers propose multidimensional legislation - both broadly 
and in areas targeted by the Congressional Black Caucus - the likelihood that a bill progresses 
through the legislative process increases dramatically; this is especially true during the most recent 
period of Democratic majority control. 
I begin with a brief survey of the literature concerning the pursuit of Black issues and 
transition immediately into a conversation focused on how the nature of these issues can - and 
likely do - spawn cross-cutting legislation. I, then, examine the concerted effort on the part of Black 
lawmakers to design and propose multidimensional laws that cut across committee jurisdictions. 
This includes the role and motivations of collective organizations of marginalized representatives - 
or caucuses - in the strategic development of these multidimensional policy proposals. This 
conversation prompts the proposal and testing hypotheses concerning the progress of bills 
sponsored by Black representatives in the 103rd, 110th, and 111th Congresses. Following a 
discussion of the data and methodology, I report and discuss the findings of the analysis. Finally, I 
conclude with a discussion of the implications on future research. 
Inefficiencies and Inequality in Committee Politics 
Committees function as mechanisms that facilitate the pursuit of personal, constituent, and 
institutional goals. Stewart III (2012) summarizes the evolution of literature concerning the role of 
the congressional committee in the House of Representatives nicely. He argues, the post-war 
committee can be characterized by six distinct roles: the literature sees committees as groups, as 
election facilitators, as stability inducers, as rent-seekers, as party agents, and as information providers. At an 
individual level, membership on a particular committee provides, or indicates a previous existence 
of, a certain level of expertise or knowledge in that particular policy area. Membership on a 
committee also provides some members the opportunity to exert a degree of leverage over policy 
areas that concern them that arise either as a function of personal expertise or from constituency 
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demands (see Bullock 1973; Shepsle and Weingast 1987 Leighton and Lopez 2002; Frisch and Kelly 
2006; Adler and Lapinski 1997 among countless others). From an institutional perspective, 
congressional committees serve three key organizational functions. First, they create a system where 
the labor of the institution is divided among engaged and interested members (Gamm and Shepsle 
1989). It serves as a filtration agent in an effort to identify which problems deserve attention - and 
which do not (Krutz 2005; Krutz and Cullison 2008). Lastly, it serves as a means to seek out, 
acquire, and process information on policy problems and potential solutions (Krehbiel, Shepsle, 
and Weingast 1987; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1990; May, Sapotichne, and Workman 2006; Workman, 
Jones, and Jochim 2009; Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). 
For Black lawmakers, committee politics play out in a number of ways. On one hand, Black 
members are increasing their influence in a number of committees - including several thought of 
at the top of the committee hierarchy. Once there, members are able to draw attention towards key 
issues on their collective agenda through hearings (Ellis and Wilson 2013; Minta 2011). However 
when it comes to passing actual legislation, their influence is less evident, particularly when it comes 
to forwarding more racialized proposals beyond the committee phase. Scholars have found 
structural barriers that exist within the chamber. Congressional committees are “clearly stratified” 
(Matthews 1960, 152), with a pecking order that provides select members the chance to “gain the 
power and prestige it offers, in order to serve his constituency. However, while minority members 
do not request placements on lower committees (Frisch and Kelly 2006), Griffin and Keane (2011) 
found that, on average, minority MCs consistently receive less valuable committee assignments 
(findings supported by Rocca, Sanchez, and Morin 2011). In their committee interactions, Black 
lawmakers face interpersonal marginalization, silencing, and topic extinction - conditions that have 
“palpable consequences for their identities and their policy priorities” (Hawkesworth 2003, 546). 
Ultimately, committees work to induce institutional stability in the lawkmaking process 
(Polsby 1968). This desire for stability - both in legislative outcomes and between actors ultimately 
places Black lawmakers at a disadvantage when seeking to make non-incremental changes to a rigid 
status quo that has long plagued Black Americans. Substantive policy change will likely require a 
collective effort designed to create, expose, or capitalize on vulnerabilities in the institutional design 
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in order to achieve their legislative goals. In theory, this structure should facilitate an efficient 
legislative process. However, this is not always the case - even under periods of consensus. A 
contributing factor to this inefficiency may be the fact that the division of labor, itself is imperfect; 
congressional committees are marred by poorly-defined, overlapping jurisdictions that threaten to 
further complicate the problemsolving functions of the legislative process (Jones and Baumgartner 
2005; Lewallen 2018). Policy jurisdictions are neither stable nor permanent; they constantly evolve 
through formal and informal modifications and procedural adjustments (King 1994; Adler and 
Wilkerson 2011). This article is an attempt to uncover how Black lawmakers can use strategic policy 
design to improve their prospects in the House of Representatives. 
Black Interests and Multidimensional Legislation 
Despite an abundance of literature suggesting Black lawmakers partake in policymaking 
that is driven by their identity and the unique experiences that are associated with it, the jury is still 
out as to their ability to translate such efforts into substantive policy gains. Early measures of 
minority representation and responsiveness were largely framed through voting behavior on a 
constricted set of bills in policy areas that members of color should care about - with mixed results 
(Whitby 2000; Swain 1993; Gay 2007; Tate 2001). These disjointed findings may be the product of 
individualized approaches and late stage processes. Increasingly scholars are reaching beyond 
voting behavior for evidence of substantive representation. At the state level, Black representatives 
sponsor significantly more bill in Black interest areas (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Miller 1989). At 
the federal level, scholars have begun to engage the process of lawmaking to find examples of Black 
representatives championing racialized policy issues (Canon 1995; Canon 1999). An emerging line 
of research concerning Black representatives examines the role of increasingly sophisticated 
infrastructures created to routinely shape the discourse around and attempt to draw attention to 
Black interests in debate, deliberation, and oversight (Minta 2011; Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 
2013; Tyson 2016). It is through these caucuses where members organize, strategize, and pool 
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resources in an effort to forward their collective goals (Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985; 
Hammond 1991; Stevens, Mulhollan, and Rundquist 1981). 
At their core, Black lawmakers are tasked with solving complex, multidimensional issues 
that plague the lives of Black communities throughout the country. Multidimensional - also referred 
to as cross-cutting or boundary-spanning - policies are multifaceted, complex proposals that 
becoming increasingly prevalent in the House of representatives. Multidimensionality can be the 
product of an effort to solve problems for multiple target populations, across a broad spectrum of 
ideological preferences, or - for Black lawmakers - through an attempt at addressing inequality 
through racialized and de-recialized means. On the other hand, these types of policies may emerge 
due to the complex nature of issues that are ill-fit to current jurisdictional arrangements. Those 
tasked with addressing these issues must, first, categorize the multiple components tied to the 
particular issue (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). An earnest attempt at problem-solving in issue 
areas that concern marginalized groups may result in the realization that the problems are layered 
and interwoven. For example, poverty in Black constituencies goes well beyond job creation - it 
can be traced to inequality in educational opportunities, the development of communities and 
infrastructure, the availability of affordable childcare, access to cost-saving and preventative 
healthcare services, and a number of other conditions that span across several committee 
jurisdictions (Ogbu 1979; Fleming 1985; Shapiro 2004). The “Jobs and Justice Act” is merely an 
example of what a holistic approach to solving issues in the Black community would resemble. This 
was not always a strategy of choice for the Congressional Black Caucus; until recently, CBC 
members’ legislative pursuits were thought of as narrow, unidimensional, as well as ideologically 
and racially radical (Swain 1993; Singh 1998; Tate 2014). The question remains, what impact does 
a shift towards multidimensional legislation have on their legislative fortunes? 
Multiple Referrals and the Pursuit of Black Interests 
As policymakers learn - either through trial and error or through policy learning - they 
constantly look to readjust their strategy in search of more favorable outcomes (Sabatier 1991; May 
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1992; Pralle 2003; Tate 2014; Tyson 2016). Changes in strategy can be prompted by improved 
understanding of the legislative environment, an improved understanding of policy problems or 
potential solutions, or even by perpetual losing in the political arena (May 1992; Wildavsky 1979). 
The Congressional Black Caucus is unique in their need for a sophisticated, institutionalized means 
to devise a plan of action that is distinct from the larger party apparatus as they seek to advance 
issues that have yet to be adopted onto the Democratic agenda (Frymer 2010. Black lawmakers 
have established - and rely heavily on - an extra-party infrastructure of taskforces and working 
groups that serve as policy laboratories, vessels for strategic planning, and sources of information 
gathering and dissemination (Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Hammond, Mulhollan, and 
Stevens 1985). It is here where the Caucus looks to take advantage of member expertise, interests, 
or advantageous committee placements in relevant policy areas to formulate a plan of attack. 
Additionally, organizations with the longevity of the CBC - who’s members are often characterized 
as electorally secure, increasingly senior, and gaining in institutional influence - are able to draw on 
accumulated institutional knowledge to shape their collective behaviors. 
It is through these mechanisms that members of the Caucus become acutely aware of the 
constraints associated with their respective political systems and will alter their strategy to 
circumvent barriers to policy change by seeking out more favorable arenas to achieve their goals 
(Schattschneider 1975; Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Pralle 2003). In this instance, I point to a shift 
in strategy on the part of Congressional Black Caucus members to sponsor bills that result in 
multiple committee referrals - a process that greatly resembles the concept of venue shopping. Venue 
shopping in the House means actors display (1) an understanding of the institutional features that 
determine how those bills are disseminated to various committees, and (2) a deliberate shift in the 
designing of policies that allows them to seek out favorable venues (committees) within the 
institution in order to drive attention toward those issues. 
Sarah Pralle (2003, 240) argues, “policy entrepreneurs and advocacy groups might abstain 
from venue shopping altogether when an institution has firm jurisdictional control over an issue 
control that is uncontested and perhaps uncontestable”. Figure 1 suggest this was the case in the 
103rd Congress. In fact, prior to the 109th, Black lawmakers lagged behind the House average in 
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both average sponsorship of bills resulting in multiple referral and the average number of 
committees to which their bills are referred to. In the 109th, however, the sponsorship of cross-
cutting legislation increased from 24% to 35% of all bills. This sudden shift is a stark difference 
from the gradual increase experienced by the remaining House members. In addition, while most 
political institutions await “windows of opportunity” to arise in order to seek out policy change 
(Kingdon 2011), this change in tactics predates the most commonly-associated window available 
in Congress - majority control. If committee jurisdictions evolve “informally and incrementally”, 
as scholars suggest (Adler and Wilkerson 2011, 88; see also King 1994; King 2008), one could 
expect very moderate increases in bills resulting in multiple referrals. The abrupt, collective nature 
of the shift in such activities in the 109th Congress suggest two important notions: this shift in 
trends was both abnormal and absent favorable partisan conditions. Scholars often point to a 
number of reforms - both formal and informal - over the years that have directly contributed to 
the decentralization of the House of Representatives (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Schickler 2001; 
Rohde 2010; Adler and Wilkerson 2011). One consequence this destabilization has been a shift 
towards omnibus and minibus proposals (Krutz 2000; Krutz 2001b; Krutz 2001a; Sinclair 2011; 
Davidson 1988; Hanson 2014). 
  
Figure 1: Depicts trends in multiple referrals from the 103rd - 112th Congress. 
Scholars are mixed on the effects of such a trend on the prospects of legislation. Some argue that 
bills that span multiple committees introduce more veto points into the process (Davidson, 
Oleszek, and Kephart 1988; Krutz and Cullison 2008). Others find that omnibus legislation can be 
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effective in building support for elements of the bill and breaking down institutional costs that 
often lead to gridlock (Krutz 2000; Krutz 2001a; Sinclair 2011). The Jobs and Justice Act of 2018 and 
others like it provides evidence that the Black Caucus understands the shift in trends towards 
multidimensional legislation and has decided that the sponsorship of such legislation is a feasible 
alternative. 
What impact could this surge in multidimensional bill sponsorship have on Black members’ 
quest for success in their targeted policy agenda? Multiple referrals could serve as mechanisms to 
mitigate institutional costs and cut through the layers of friction that exist in American political 
institutions that work against change in Black policy areas. Researchers of identity caucuses - like 
the Congressional Black Caucus - argue there may be some validity to venue-shopping as a 
legislative strategy; “the groups perform an integrative role, developing legislative programs which 
cut across committee boundaries [and] take the lead in drafting legislative proposals, monitoring 
developments throughout Congress and the executive branch, and persuading to their viewpoint 
members of the various committees” dealing in relevant policy areas (Hammond, Mulhollan, and 
Stevens 1985, 429; see also Stevens,Mulhollan, and Rundquist 1981). I offer four arguments as to 
why the sponsorship of bills that result in multiple referrals may prove effective - and potentially 
necessary - for Black lawmakers attempting to navigatae the legislative process. 
 
Multidimensional Policy Images and Policy Success 
Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones assert unidimensionality can often lead to institutional 
inattention. A dominant public policy image is often unidimensional even while the underlying 
issue is multidimensional. In decision-making institutions, attention is often directed at only one 
aspect or dimension, while others are suppressed or ignored (Baumgartner and Jones 2002, 21). 
Because Black lawmakers adopted unidimensional definitions to policy problems, this often 
simplified the larger institutional responses to any proposals by allowing key decision makers to 
paint a dominant policy image that were likely perceived as ideologically radical, racially contentious, 
and out of touch with the demands of the larger party apparatus. As a result, the concerns of Blacks 
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were largely ignored for most of the twentieth century. (Singh 1998; Tate 2014; Swain 1993). 
However, as Baumgartner and Jones (2002, 21) point out, adopting embracing the complexity of 
Black interest could work to their advantage in seeking more favorable outcomes in their proposals: 
“As a practical matter, most decision makers pay attention to only a few of the 
underlying dimensions. At times, however, they may be forced to pay greater attention to one 
of the elements that they had been ignoring, as when dimensions force themselves onto the 
agenda because of a crisis or because of the actions of another decision maker. When 
this occurs, people can change their views on the issue even without changing their minds on the 
underlying dimension of choice; they simply give greater weight to a dimension that they had been 
previously ignoring.” (Italics added by author for emphasis) 
By highlighting multidimensionality in their bill design, Black lawmakers could shift 
attention away from the more contentious, racialized, and narrow aspects of their proposals - 
dimensions that frequently lead to inactivity - and towards different dimensions that may be more 
“palatable” to decision makers. By defining issues in a different fashion, and designing proposals 
that reflect this shift in strategy, Black members could ease bills through the legislative process 
without diminishing the proposal’s intended effects on their constituencies. 
Circumventing Institutional Marginalization 
For Black lawmakers, it may be necessary to look deeper to uncover an additional layer of 
friction that may impede their success - a condition that those in office are certainly aware of. Some 
point to marginalization in the institution that could work to thwart or mask substantive progress 
in the chamber. Moreover, American politics have long been plagued with racialized ordering that 
has undoubtedly bled into institutions and shaped preferences, processes, and policy outcomes 
(King and Smith 2005; Dawson and Cohen 2002; Holt 2009). Thus, Cobb and Elder (1997) add 
that there are often cultural components to decisions of which issues arrive on the institution’s 
legislative agenda. Black lawmakers have been found to receive less favorable committee 
assignments (Griffin and Keane 2011). Further, Hawkesworth (2003, 546) points to interpersonal 
marginalization where “in committee operations, floor debates, and interpersonal interactions, they 
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and their policy priorities”. Frymer (2010, 2011) along with Griffin and Keane (2011) forward 
claims that inter-party dynamics work against the substantive pursuit of Black interests. Venue 
shopping could be a means to overcome institutional marginalization. 
As the membership of Black representatives increases within the chamber, as members 
broaden their coverage across committees, and as members become more incorporated into the 
institutional power structure, designing policy proposals with multiple dimensions may increase the 
likelihood that the bill is referred to a committee where more favorable outcomes are possible. 
Reaching multiple committees could mean landing in committees with higher concentrations of 
Black lawmakers or, better, with control over the committee or relevant subcommittees and means 
- like the ability to schedule hearings and other committee procedures - to draw attention to these 
proposals (Ellis and Wilson 2013). Venue shopping also increases the likelihood that bills will 
surface in committees that have conducted oversight over Black-interest policies, have frequently 
engaged bureaucratic agents, and are privy to vital policy information (Workman, Shafran, and Bark 
2017; Minta 2011). 
Capitalizing on Institutional Instability 
Scholars point to a number of reforms over the years that have directly contributed to the 
destabilization of the House of Representatives (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Schickler 2001; Rohde 
2010; Adler and Wilkerson 2011). Political institutions are the result of layers of innovations; not 
all of which are comparable to and compatible with one another (Schickler 2001). In the case of 
Republican era legislative reforms, these layers of were accrued in a relatively short period of time 
and decidedly reshaped the priorities and functioning of House of Representatives. This series of 
restructuring further entrenched many of these conditions by reaffirming legislative control in the 
hands of majority party leadership, sparking and playing on inter-party conflict, and further 
reducing the role of committees by encouraging the packaging of legislation into minibus and 
omnibus bills. 
On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House - led by newly appointed Speaker Newt 
Gingrich - passed sweeping rules changes aimed at increasing transparency, reducing operating 
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costs, and reducing legislative inefficiencies perceived to exist prior to the shift in majority control 
of the House. Relevant to this study are two decisions that restructured the process of legislative 
referrals. First, the Gingrich reforms eliminated three committees altogether - the Post Office, 
Merchant and Marine Fisheries, and District of Columbia Committees. This decision, combined 
placing limits on the number of committee assignments (2) and subcommittee appointments (4), 
resulted in an overall reduction of 484 committee and subcommittee seats (Deering and Smith 
1997). In addition to the structural changes, the reduction of committees also resulted in a necessary 
reshuffling of jurisdictions to account for the reduction in committee force. 
The second formal rule change concerning legislative jurisdictions was the complete 
elimination of joint referrals. Prior to “Contract” reforms, as a product of 1974 committee reform, 
bills were able to acquire referrals to multiple committees through either joint, split, or sequential 
jurisdictions. Eliminating joint referrals - and the decision to continue to allow split and sequential 
referrals - was justified by a need to reduce policy fragmentation and overlap many attributed to 
the Speakers ability to provide multiple committees equal ownership over pieces of legislation. 
However, this decision was revisited in the 108th Congress with a minor, informal, adjustment that 
allowed for such referrals under a vaguely defined “exceptional circumstances” (Congressional 
Research Service 2014). It is likely that such impreciseness may have lead to some degree of 
uncertainty and to what qualified for joint referrals. Another period of adjustment to the “Contract” 
reforms came as a result of suggestions from the 9/11 Commission. The creation of the 
Department of Homeland Security came with it conflicts over policy and administrative 
jurisdictions that would have be sorted out as well as new jurisdictional responsibilities that had yet 
to be defined. This period of reform was highly contentious, and a strategy took much longer to 
devise and implement then the one-day turnaround of the initial “contract” (Reese 2013). 
While formal reforms seek to stabilize and codify committee practices (Adler and Wilkerson 
2011), informal adjustment to committee jurisdictions - or “common law advances” breeds 
uncertainty over existing and future jurisdictional arrangements (King 2008). Such informal 
practices induce reaction of competing interests and turf wars between committees who compete 
for jurisdiction over areas of interest (King 1994; Evans 1999; King 2008; Adler and Wilkerson 
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2011). Often, efforts to construct narrow jurisdictional definitions can lead to further uncertainty 
as committees struggle to parse out or coordinate complex policies with several moving parts 
(Baumgartner, Jones, and MacLeod 2000). Adler and Wilkerson argue, members recognize the 
problems associated with stagnant committee jurisdictions “issue fragmentation, conflicting 
policies, and insufficient information sharing” - and work to counteract them (Adler and Wilkerson 
2011, 107). These jurisdictional battles often result in bill sponsorships, hearings, and other forms 
of engagement with issues in an effort to set precedents for future jurisdictional considerations. 
If committee jurisdictions evolve “informally and incrementally”, as scholars suggest (Adler 
and Wilkerson 2011, 88; see also King 1994; King 2008), one could expect very moderate increases 
in bills resulting in multiple referrals. As precedent sets in, certainty should take hold and referral 
practices should stabilize. This appears not to be the case following reforms in the 104th Congress. 
Figure 4 reveals noticeable increase in bills resulting in multiple referrals that is consistent and 
proportionate to the total output of the chamber. Periods of uncertainty could be indicated by 
punctuations in multiple referrals as parliamentarians respond to efforts to redefine jurisdictions. 
Such punctuations are evident in the disproportionate increases in multiple referrals following the 
minor adjustments to the “Contract” in the 106th and a more prolonged punctuation following 
informal changes resulting from the 9/11 Commission recommendations and the subsequent shift 
in partisan control in the 109th and 110th Congress. Multiple referrals eventually declined - 
returning to its long-run trend - as Republicans retook the chamber in 2010. 
Multiple Committee Referrals and Reform in the House of Representatives 
 
Figure 2: Depicts trends in multiple referrals from the 103rd - 112th Congress. 
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The inefficiencies in jurisdictional overlap and redundancy that routinely plague Congress 
were exacerbated by a series of formal and informal restructuring of congressional committees 
during the Republican rule of the House of Representatives. This analysis seeks to further explore 
the evolution of the modern congressional committee and what could be political ramifications 
that directly impact members of color within the chamber. Adler and Wilkerson (2011, 107) argue 
“informal practices such as these can set in motion a path dependent process that can undermine 
other policy objectives”. Can they also bolster some policy objectives by providing opportunities 
for entrepreneurial legislators to exploit ambiguous committee boundaries during times of 
uncertainty, as Evans (1999) suggest? How does the reorganization of jurisdictional arrangements 
alter the pursuit of Black issues in the House? 
Venue shopping requires policymakers to be aware of jurisdictional constraints of particular 
venues as well as potential vulnerabilities in those constraints and acting in a way that exposes those 
vulnerabilities (Schattschneider 1975; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Pralle 2003). Black lawmakers 
could have a substantial impact on the legislative agenda through multiple referrals by capitalizing 
on legislative instability, competition, and uncertainty that is often associated with periods of 
institutional reform. If reform breeds institutional uncertainty, then that uncertainty breeds 
opportunity for Black lawmakers to pursue those interests that are typically undermined by the 
rigidity of political institutions. 
Multiple referrals induce - or are the result of - competition among committees as they 
struggle to gain jurisdiction over relevant issues. Also, as King (1994; 2008) notes, Black members 
could seek to sway jurisdictional battles by sponsoring bills from within committees in hopes of 
establishing or stretching parliamentary precedents. The jurisdictional battles that emerge during 
periods of reform often result in bill sponsorships, hearings, and other processes in an effort to set 
precedents for future jurisdictional considerations (King 2008). Additionally, committees may 
preempt these jurisdictional battles with hearings in broad topic areas, providing avenues for Black 
committee members to take a more active role in shaping policy action. Therefore, 
multidimensional legislation becomes the mechanism through which representatives of color seek 
to drive attention from both inside and outside of relevant committees. 
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Mitigating Institutional Costs 
Multidimensional legislation can cut through institutional costs that have become barriers 
of inattention for Black interests. First, due to the complexity of Black issues, it may be necessary 
for multiple committees to take on the role of information gatherers in their particular substantive 
jurisdictions. Allowing for several committees to divide the labor involved with recognizing and 
defining problems as well as weighing the proposed solution against alternatives would certainly 
reduce the informational burden that would be incurred by a single committee taking on such 
complex issues. Boundary-spanning proposals also create opportunities for committees with 
broader jurisdictions to take on new issues that may have previously been ignored by the institution 
(Sheingate 2006), and for members across the multiple committees or through the agencies under 
their jurisdiction to apply their perceived expertise to deliberating and reshaping the legislation 
(Workman, Shafran, and Bark 2017). Sponsoring bills that receive multiple referrals could reduce 
transaction costs through increased exposure and the potential of coalition building that comes 
along with distributing bills to multiple committees. As bills progress through several committees, 
it creates opportunities to acquire additional cosponsors from out-group allies in chamber. 
This reduction in transaction costs may have carryover effects on bill prospects on the 
floor. Those bills have potentially garnered at the attention of leadership on multiple committees, 
been exposed to multiple members from both parties providing opportunities to build coaltitions 
within the chamber, and possibly rewritten to maximize the bill’s chances on the floor. In a modern 
Congress, characterized by a strong hand in the process on the part of leadership, the fact that a 
bill has navigated a committee may be a function of approval by party higher-ups and may already 
have assurances from leadership of future scheduling (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Stewart III 2012). 
Thus, there is reason to believe sponsorship will have positive effects of multiple committee 
referrals on the prospects of success in floor votes. These things in mind, I propose two hypotheses 
concerning the impact of Black lawmakers sponsoring cross-cutting legislation in general and in 
Black-interest areas: 
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Hypothesis 1 For Black lawmakers, sponsoring bills that result in multiple committee referrals will improve the 
bill’s likelihood of successfully navigating the legislative process. 
Hypothesis 2 Sponsoring Black-interest bills that result in multiple committee referrals will improve the bill’s 
likelihood of successfully navigating the legislative process. 
Design and Methodology 
To determine how the sponsorship of multidimensional legislation impacts the pursuit of 
Black interests in the House of Representatives, I employ bill-level analysis of sponsorship by Black 
lawmakers. Scholars acknowledge the political fortunes of Black lawmakers are constrained by the 
electoral fortunes of the Democratic party (Swain 1993; Tate 2003; Canon 1995). The fact that the 
caucus is nearly uniformly comprised of Democrats, periods of Republican control have proven to 
greatly diminish the effectiveness of Black lawmakers across all policy areas, racialized or otherwise. 
Driven by this reality, I opt to constrain the general focus of this query so that it reflects outcomes 
of only substantive bills sponsored in Democratic majorities by examining sponsorship in the 103rd 
in comparison to the 110th and 111th Congress. Later, I extend the sample to include bills 
sponsored by all members from the 103rd - 110th Congress to place the results within the broader 
institutional context. 
I concentrate my attention on both trends in the broader sponsorship patterns of Black 
lawmakers as well as in policy areas that are a part of their collective interests. To accomplish this, 
I subset the 1,595 bills produced by Black Caucus members in Democratic majorities to highlight 
policy topics that fall with the Congressional Black Caucus’ expressed agenda. Each year, the CBC 
publishes their public agenda to the Congressional Record and on their website. From this agenda, 
I identify 662 bills forty-four well-articulated policy areas that also fall within the policy jurisdictions 
of their taskforces and working groups during the period in question (see Table 1). Figure 3A 
visualizes the productivity of Black members in both general sponsorship as well as in targeted 
areas. There are noticeable increases in output during times of Democratic majority control of the 
House - particularly in the most recent period in the 110th and 111th Congresses. There is also a 
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steady increase in CBC-Interest bills; the caucus nearly doubled its output from the 103rd to the 
110th Congress.1 
 
Dependent Variables and Model Selection 
The hypotheses proposed focus on two particular benchmarks in the legislative process: 
clearing the committee stage and receiving a favorable vote on the House floor. These two 
checkpoints represent two of the most significant - and most difficult - hurdles to clear in the 
House. Thus, the first dependent variable of interest is a dichotomous indicator that a bill has 
received a report out of at least one committee. Committee reports are one of the better identifiers 
that a bill has fully navigated a committee that it was referred to. It is often accompanied by the 
history of the bill, signals that the bill has been thoroughly considered and rewritten, and can also 
recommend action to the floor. Committee reports are also a good indicator of the discriminant 
nature of legislative winnowing - where proposals are filtered before they are ever considered for 
action (Krutz 2005). The multitude of proposals that emerge at any given time, only a fraction of 
bills that are introduced will receive formal attention. On average, only ten-percent of sponsored 
bills in any given term actually receive a report from a committee of referral. 
If only a fraction of bills clear the committee stage, even fewer make it to an official roll-
call vote. Doing so means - in most cases - that you have successfully navigated the committee 
stage, avoided any major pitfalls during debate and deliberation, have received approval from party 
leadership, and have acquired enough of a consensus - by at least a majority of the majority party - 
to ensure that a vote can be both scheduled and see a favorable outcome.2 The failure to achieve 
any one of these conditions could prove to impede the progress of a bill. Thus, bills that have 
navigated the slew of informal obstacles are in rarefied air; only eight-percent of bills sponsored in 
the House passed a floor vote in between the 103rd and 112th Congress. 
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This table identifies issues of interest for the Congressional Black Caucus. Comparative Agendas Project (CAP) minor topics codes are included for reference. 
Task Force Policy Area (CAP Code) 
Education and Labor Employment Training (502) 
Fair Labor Standards (505) 
Youth Employment, Youth Job Corps Programs, and Child Labor (506) 
Migrant and Seasonal workers, Farm Labor Issues (529) 
Immigration Reform (530) 
General Education Education (601) 
Higher Education (601) 
Elementary & Secondary Education (602) 
Education of Underprivileged Students (603) 
Educational Excellence (607) 
Criminal Justice Reform General Criminal Justice Reform (1200) 
Court Administration (1204) 
Prisons (1205) 
Juvenile Crime and Justice System (1206) 
Police (1209) 
Criminal and Civil Code (1210) 
Riots, Crime Prevention, and Crime Control (1211) 
Healthcare Healthcare Reform (301) 
Insurance (302) 
Facilities construction, regulation, and payments (322) 
Health Manpower & Training (325) 
Prevention, communicable diseases and health promotion (331) 
Infants and Children (332) 
Alcohol & Drug Abuse, Treatment, and Education (342) 
Economic Development and Wealth Creation Consumer Finance (1504) 
Small Business (1521) 
Consumer Safety and Consumer Fraud (1525) 
Civil &Voting Rights General Civil Rights (200) 
Minority Discrimination (201) 
Voting Rights (206) 
Poverty Reduction General Social Welfare (1300) 
Food Assistance & Nutrition Monitoring Programs (1301) 
Low Income Assistance (1302) 
Low Income Housing (1406) 
Housing Assistance for Homeless and Homeless Issues (1406) 
Technology & Infrastructure Community Development (1401) 
Urban Development (1403) 
Infrastructure (1010) 
Drinking Water Safety (701) 
Symbolic Currency, Commemorative Coins, Medals, U.S. Mint (2006) 
Federal Holidays (2030) 
National Parks, Memorials, Historic Sites, (2101) 
Domestic Disaster Relief (1523) 
 
Figure 3C reveals two realities. First, success at the committee level and on the floor is 
largely dependent on Democratic control. This is not a surprise, especially when one considers the 
overwhelming majority of Black representatives are members of the Democratic Party. The CBC 
is even more exclusively Democratic. The second reality is that winnowing is just as unkind to 
Black members as it is their non-black counterparts. An overwhelming majority of bills sponsored 
never see action in the chamber. Of the 1,495 bills in the sample, only 173 bills received a committee 
report - of those, 50 were in Black-interest areas. 208 Black-sponsored bills passed a House floor 
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vote in that same time span with 58 being in areas targeted by the CBC. In both cases, a need arises 
for a model that is designed specifically to handle the dichotomous nature of both dependent 
variables of interest. In this instance, I opt for a Bayesian variant of the Probit model. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The figure above represents the number of bills sponsored by members of the 
Congressional Black Caucus from the 103rd - 112th Congress. 
 
Independent Variables of Interest 
The two key independent variables of interest in this analysis are both indicators of multiple 
referrals of an individual bill sponsored by Black members in the House. Formally, Rule X defines 
committee jurisdictions as well as the process surrounding the referral of bills that is carried out by 
the parliamentarian working in conjuction with the Speaker of the House. The current arrangement 
of committee jurisdictions is the product of competition and power grabs at the committee level 
that has resulted in disjointed, overlapping jurisdictions (King 1994; King 2008; Jones and 
Baumgartner 2005). The first is a dichotomous variable that represents the 1,093 bills that received 
multiple committee referrals over the span of the sample. The second covariate of interests is designed 
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to measure the additive impact of bill referrals. I, therefore include a count of the total number of 
committees that a bill was referred to. 
These variables are drawn directly from the Comparative Agendas’ congressional bill 
dataset (Adler and Wilkerson 2018). The nature of the CAP dataset comes with its advantages - 
primarily, their extensive efforts to catalogue the topical concentration of each bill along with 
comprehensive sponsor and process-level variables. However, there are several drawbacks that are 
directly related to this study. Ideally, I would account for the various forms of bill sponsorship 
(joint, split, and sequential). The data also does not clarify which committees have jurisdiction over 
which element of a given bill. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I do not attempt to distinguish 
between the different forms of bill referral in this analysis as it is just beyond the scope of this 
inquiry. I am more concerned with exposure to multiple committees rather than the chain of 
command when it comes to individual bills. 
Of those bills, 398 were in areas targeted by the Congressional Black Caucus. Figure 4A 
reveals that multiple referrals nearly tripled for Black members in the time between Democratic 
majorities. In total, 77 bills in the sample were referred to multiple committees in the 103rd 
Congress - 32 of which were in CBC interest areas; that number increased to 223 bills (77 CBC-
interest bills) in the 110th. As seen in Figure 1, by the 110th Congress, more than one-third of all 
bills sponsored by Black lawmakers were referred to multiple committees - well above the chamber 
average. Panel B in Figure 4 highlights a steady increase in average committees per bill. 
Additional Considerations 
To facilitate my analysis of the impact of multiple referrals on bill success for Black 
lawmakers, I incorporate a number of control variables that are most often associated with a bill’s 
prospects in the House. I include a count-level control variable that notes the number of cosponsors 
a particular bill has garnered. In addition, I account for the ideological extremity of the primary sponsor 
by including the absolute value of DW-Nominate with the expectation that more extreme members 
will experience less favorable outcomes resulting from their sponsorship. I also consider the length 
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of a member’s service within the chamber with a measure of seniority. Of course, some members 
are simply more effective at forwarding legislation than others. To control for this variation, I 
include Volden and Wiseman’s (2014) measure of legislative effectiveness for each primary sponsor. 
Finally, those with access and influence in respective committees are expected to have an insider’s 
advantage (Krutz 2005). Thus, I take account of bills that are sponsored by members of a committee 
that the bill was referred to, and those that occupied chairmanships of committees or sub-committees of referred 
committees. 
Figure 4: The figures above represents the number of bills sponsored from the 103rd - 112th 
Congress. Shaded regions indicate periods during Republican majority control. 
The Effects of Multiple Referrals on Bill Prospects 
Analysis reveals significant effects of multiple referrals on bill progress and passage for bills 
sponsored by Black Lawmakers. When it comes to navigating the committee stage, both the 
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dichotomous (coef = 1.123; p < 0.001) and additive (coef = 0.241; p < 0.05) measures exerted 
positive influence on the likelihood of receiving a committee report in the 103rd Congress (Models 
1 and 2 in Table 2, respectively). This trend continued in the next Democratic majority. Coefficients 
in Model 5 and 6 in Table 2 further support the hypothesis that, at the committee stage, designing 
proposals in a manner that ensures they receive referrals to multiple committees increases the 
likelihood that bills progress through the process. 
Figure 5A and B reveals the substantive impact of multiple referrals on prospects at the 
committee level. In the 103rd Congress, the dichotomous indication that a bill had received 
multiple referrals results in an increase of receiving a committee report by 9.2%. The additive 
measure indicates a bill that is referred to three committees experiences, on average, a twopercent 
increase in predicted probability over those referred to only two committees and a 3.2% increase 
over those referred to a single committee. In the 110th the effects were similar in the dichotomous 
measure - with a 9.2% increase in probability - and slightly better in with the additive measure. Just 
over nine-percent of bills referred to three committees received committee reports compared to 
just 4.2% of those referred to a single committee. 
 
 Committee Report Floor Vote Committee Report Floor Vote 
 
 
Sponsor Level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bill Level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 2: Probit Coefficients of the impact of multiple referrals on the on bill prospects during 
Democratic majorities in the 103rd Congress along with the 110th and 111th Congresses 
103 rdCongress 110 th-111thCongress 
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Figure 5: This figure depicts changes in coefficient impact of multiple referrals on progress and 
passage for all bills from the 103rd (Grey) and the 110th and 111th Congresses (Gold) holding all 
else constant. Point estimates displayed are the result of 11,000 Bayesian simulations. Confidence 
intervals are the distribution of 1,000 simulations of each point estimate across the span of each 
measure. 
The most noticeable effects of multiple referrals in bills sponsored by Black lawmakers are 
present in models concerning success on the House floor in both Democratic majorities. The 
measures perform as expected in models concerning the likelihood of receiving a favorable floor 
vote in the 103rd Congress (Models 3 and 4) as well as the subsequent majority (Models 7 and 8). 
In the 103rd Congress, receiving multiple referrals (Model 3) increased the probability of receiving 
a favorable floor vote by twenty-two percent over bills referred to a single committee (coef = 0.929; 
p < 0.001). In the 110th to the 111th Congress (Model 7), that difference was 19.% (coef = 0.563; 
p < 0.001). The additive effects were also clearly stronger in the models predicting floor success. 
Two committee referrals increased the probability of a bill passing a floor vote by 5% in the 103rd 
with an additional increase of 7.3% for those referred to three committees. In the next Democratic 
majority (Model 8), two referrals resulted in an increase of 4.8% when adding a second committee 
and an additional increase of 8.1% for a third (Figure 5C and D). 
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CBC Interest Bills 
The second hypothesis in this study predicts that multiple referrals will improve the 
prospects of Black-interest bills in the House. Results from Table 3 suggest that this was not the 
case in the 103rd Congress. Multiple referrals had no significant impact on prospects of receiving 
a committee report (Models 1 and 2) or bill passage (Models 3 and 4). It was not until after an 
extended period under Republican control and finally retaking control in the 110th that multiple 
referrals became advantageous for those seeking to forward Black-interest bills through the 
legislative process. As predicted, in the most recent Democratic majority, Blackinterest bills 
benefited from being packaged in a way that resulted in multiple referrals even when controlling 
for member leadership, seniority, and effectiveness. 
In measuring the impact of multiple referrals on the likelihood of receiving a committee report, the 
dichotomous variable yielded an average log-odds coefficient effect of 0.717 and the additive 
resulted in an impact of 0.279 (both significant at p < 0.001). A less than one-percent chance in 
passing the floor in the 103rd increase to an average probability 10% - a five to thirty% probability 
across the range of Bayesian simulations - for bills sponsored with multiple referrals (Figure 6A). 
The additive effect in the 110th and 111th was significantly greater than in the 103rd as well. 
Increasing the bill referrals from one committees to two increased the probability of receiving a 
report from a 3.2% to 5.9%, and a third committee increases the probability of receiving a 
committee referral to 10.1% (Figure 6B). As with the broader sample of bills, multiple referrals was 
a much stronger predictor of a CBC-interest bill passing a floor vote (Table 3, Models 7 and 8). 
The dichotomous measure resulted in a statistically significant, 19.3% increase (from 1.6 to 20.9%) 
in predicted probability of receiving a receiving a favorable floor vote. Going from two committee 
referrals to three increases the median predicted probability from 8.8 to 16.9% (Figure 6). These 
findings allow me to confidently reject the null hypotheses for H4 in Black-interest bills at both the 
committee stage as well as on the house floor. Ultimately, when comparing prereform Democratic 
majorities to post-reform control, the difference of additive impact of multiple referrals in CBC-
interest areas is significantly greater in bills that obtain up to four committee referrals. 
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 Committee Report Floor Vote Committee Report Floor Vote 
 
 
Sponsor Level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bill Level Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 3: Probit Coefficients of the impact of multiple referrals on the on CBC-interest bill prospects 
during Democratic majorities in the 103rd Congress along with the 110th and 
111th Congresses 
 
Figure 6: This figure depicts changes in coefficient impact of multiple referrals on progress and 
passage for CBC-Interest bills in the 110th and 111th Congress. Point estimates displayed are the 
result of 11,000 Bayesian simulations holding all else constant. Confidence intervals are the 
distribution of 1,000 simulations of each point estimate across the span of each measure. 
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Multiple Referrals in the House of Representatives 
The previous section explored if crafting legislation in a way that ensures that it crosses 
committee jurisdictions could be advantageous to Black lawmakers. I transition from the 
organization’s behavior to place those results within the context of the institution. Earlier studies 
find multiple referrals have little to no substantive impacts on a bill’s likelihood of success (Krutz 
and Cullison 2008; Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988; Davidson, Oleszek, and Kephart 1988). 
Are the findings associated with the Congressional Black Caucus reflective of a much broader 
trend, or are they unique to the caucus? Figures 4 and 1 reveal a relatively steady increase in the 
volume of multiply-referred bills. How does this shape the fortune of those bills? Table 4 presents 
four fixed-effects models that test interactive effects of multiple referrals on the prospects of bills 
from the 103rd through the 112th Congress. 
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Sponsor Level Controls Y Y Y Y 
Bill Level Controls Y Y Y Y 
Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y 
 
Table 4: Probit Coefficients of the interactive effects of multiple referrals on bills sponsored by 
House members from the 103rd to the 112th Congresses 
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The findings suggest that the additive, positive impact of reaching multiple committees 
extends to the chamber as a whole, contradicting previous studies. While this article does not 
directly forward causal assumptions about the reasoning for these findings in the larger institution, 
it does offer theory that could certainly extend beyond the organization and to the chamber as a 
whole. This may the function of the various ”turf wars” that play out between committees during 
times of reform and institutional uncertainty (King 2008). As committees seek to capture issues 
within that may be beyond their jurisdictions, it is reasonable to expect them to not only sponsor 
bill from within the committee (King 1994; Evans 1999; King 2008; Adler and Wilkerson 2011) 
but to also be more likely to advance those bills through the full committee process. This provides 
an opportunity forward for scholars interested in a broader understanding of the evolution of 
lawmaking in the chamber. 
The focus of this article, however, is in determining if a collective shift in bill-sponsorship 
trends (visualized in Figure 4) can provide a means to improving their fortunes in the chamber. 
Scholars have pointed to a particular racialized marginalization that exists within the chamber 
(Hawkesworth 2003; Tyson 2016). As Hawkesworth points out, this often manifests in the form 
of legislative topic extinction, silencing, and other forms of interpersonal and structural 
marginalization. The findings from Table 4 suggests this is certainly the case. Bills sponsored by 
CBC lawmakers are about 17% less likely to see their bills reported out of any committee that they 
are referred than their non-Black counterparts in the chamber (coef = 0.182; p ¡0.01). In a legislative 
environment where members are fighting for precious agenda space where only about ten-percent 
of bills receive committee reports, that difference is certainly substantive one. This article proposed 
that multiple referrals may provide them with a means to circumvent this form of marginalization. 
The interaction in Table 4, Model 2 suggests this is not the case. While cross-cutting legislation 
improves the prospects of CBC-sponsored legislation, designing proposals in a way that results in 
multiple referrals is not a strategy that alters the trajectory of Black-sponsored bills in a significant 
fashion in relation to the rest of the chamber. 
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Primary Sponsor Bills Passed (N) Committee Chair Subcommittee Chair 
Maxine Waters 6 N Y 
Hank Johnson 5 N Y 
Bobby Scott 5 N Y 
Charlie Rangel 4 Y N 
Edolphus Towns 3 N Y 
John Conyers 2 Y N 
John Lewis 1 N Y 
Bobby Rush 1 N Y 
Elijah Cummings 1 N Y 
Danny Davis 1 N Y 
Stephanie Jones 1 Y N 
Gwen Moore 1 N N 
G.K. Butterfield 1 N N 
David Scott 1 N N 
Kendrick Meek 1 N N 
Emanuel Cleaver 1 N N 
Al Green 1 N N 
William Jefferson 1 N N 
Table 5: A descriptive summary of CBC sponsors that have succesfully passed legislation from the 
110th and 111th Congresses 
These models tell a slightly different story when it comes to a final vote on legislation. CBC 
membership has no bearing on one’s bills likelihood of passing a floor vote. The topical focus of 
the bills, however, do have a substantive bearing on the prospects of bills on the floor (Model 3 in 
Table 4). The interaction effects found in Model 4 of Table 4 suggest that that margin actually 
increases when referred to multiple committees. This result is consistent with literature that argues 
institutions shy away from considering potentially contentious policy issues (Polsby 1968; Cox and 
McCubbins 2007; Cox and McCubbins 2005, among others). Party leaders have been found to 
place their thumbs on the scale in an effort to preserve power, protect vulnerable members from 
potentially damaging votes, and maintain institutional stability. This becomes increasingly evident 
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when examining whose bills successfully navigate the legislative process. Table 5 presents a 
descriptive summary of CBC-interest bills that passed a floor vote during the 110th and 111th 
Congresses. 
This table reveals the problematic reality for Black lawmakers - particularly rank and file 
members seeking to pass substantive legislation in CBC-interest areas. In sum, only 37 of the 459 
CBC member-sponsored bills that fall at least in-part in line with the CBC agenda received a 
favorable outcomes on the House floor. Success was almost exclusively reserved for the more 
influential members - thirty of the thirty-seven bills were sponsored by members who were either 
chairs of full committees or subcommittees, and twenty-nine of the bills emerged from within a 
committee with jurisdiction over the bill. Even then, few of the bills that cleared the house floor 
were explicitly race-based in nature. Others are more de-racialized attempts to address problems 
that have broader impacts in addition to those experienced by the Black community. This includes 
bills aimed at providing and protecting low-income housing, protections for consumers, and 
regulations on policing practices around the nation. This may be further evidence of a CBC that is 
looking to moderate its policy positions (Tate 2014; Gillespie 2010; Canon 1995). Or, this could be 
a function of the Party’s selection of only tolerable legislation. The findings suggest either, or both, 
could certainly be the case. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
In this analysis, I look to examine how changing legislative tactics can improve success rates 
for a subset of lawmakers that have been plagued by less-than-modest success in an institution 
where the odds are clearly stacked against them. These findings suggest two things, both with major 
implications on policymaking on the part of lawmakers from traditionally marginalized groups. 
First, for Black lawmakers, sponsorship of cross-cutting legislation certainly has its payoffs. Doing 
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so increases the probability that Black legislators will achieve both their collective goals - evident 
in significant findings from bills sponsored in policy areas targeted by the Congressional Black 
Caucus - and in their broader individual legislative agenda. Second, it appears that there is a 
significant additive effect when it comes to the success of multidimensional legislation. In an 
institution where an overwhelming majority of bills receive no attention, complexity - in terms of 
covered policy areas - seems to be key in garnering attention. In fact, these effect appear to carry 
beyond the committee stage and into roll-call voting where exposure to multiple committees seems 
to weigh heavily on a bill’s likelihood of success. For Black members, this may be the key for 
breaking through barriers that may work against substantive policy change. 
Their approach to bill design appears to be a noticeable shift from their previous strategy. 
Multiple referrals have increased significantly for both Black representatives and among the larger 
institution, as has the average number of committees to which bills are referred. Sponsoring 
multidimensional allows for Black lawmakers to initiate and take part in jurisdictional battles 
between committees, engage in the problem recognition and definition stage of policy making, and 
activity may soften up the institution until moments of opportunity arise (Kingdon 2011). Doing 
so, also, fits in with current trends in alternative legislating in the House (Krutz 2001b; Sinclair 
2011). Multiple referrals also allows for the caucus to capitalize on its strength in numbers and a 
surge in committee influence. 
This analysis is also a cautionary tale of the problems of aggregation across groups of 
political actors in political institutions. Black lawmakers face unique challenges within the legislative 
chambers. For decades, their success has been limited by institutional inattention and 
marginalization. Consequentially, the explicit focus on Black lawmakers here is intentional. Despite 
temptations and the tendency among others in the discipline to do so, the goal of this study is not 
to compare the behaviors - or success rates - of Black lawmakers to their white counterparts. 
Haynes Walton (1985) cautions against the practice of simply adding a variable to account for the 
race of lawmaker. While such an approach accounts for racial differences among actors, it often 
fails to capture the underlying experience of marginalized members as well as the unique constraints 
that accompany those racial differences. At an aggregate level, some argue that sponsoring bills in 
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a manner that demands attention from multiple committees has little impact on success. These 
findings suggest otherwise, highlighting the importance of digging deeper and understanding that 
conditions, practices, and outcomes vary across groups and issues. If a primary goal of lawmakers 
is to sponsor bills that navigate through the legislative process, I find - for Black lawmakers, at least 
- venue shopping as a viable strategy to gaining attention in congressional committees and receiving 
more favorable outcomes in floor votes. 
This work provides an intriguing path forward for those interested in how Black lawmakers 
navigate the minefield of the House of Representatives in search of substantive policy change. 
Hopefully, this study will serve as a conversation starter for those seeking to build upon scholarship 
concerning the role of the Black lawmaker. While earlier works established a solid foundation, times 
have certainly changed since the penning of many of those essential pieces of scholarship, especially 
in there strategy, mobilization, and influence within the chamber. The institution, itself, has also 
undergone a great deal of evolution since the work of Pitkin (1967), Swain (1993), Canon (1999), 
and Tate (2001) - many of which struggled to link increased proportional representation by Black 
lawmakers and legislative wins in substantive policy areas. 
Additionally, previous findings - or the lack thereof - may be relics of a tendency for 
congressional scholarship to concentrate solely on late-stage differences and roll-call voting. 
Although, recent scholarship has shown that exploration into the lawmaking process - especially at 
the committee level - could prove fruitful (Gamble 2007; Gamble 2011; Minta and Sinclair-
Chapman 2013). Addressing this may mean that scholars must dedicate effort to identifying and 
examining political phenomenon where the politics happen. This work is an attempt to connect 
each stage of the process in an effort to determine the how tactics can influence outcomes for 
Black members of Congress. While there exists a growing consensus that the congressional 
committee’s legislative importance has diminished in recent years (Krutz 2001b; Sinclair 2011 
;Stewart III 2012), this may not be the case for all members and their pursuits. When combined 
with previous studies from the like of Gamble (2007) and Minta (2011), the preceding analysis 
suggests that the committee structure, the rules that define the structure, and the consequences of 
those structures are increasingly central to Black representatives when pursuing their legislative 
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agendas. This is especially true as they seek to capitalize on the ever-evolving political and structural 
arrangements of Congress. There should be a concerted effort explore and explain not just if Black 
lawmakers pursue policy change in key issues but how they go about doing so. Moving forward, 
more attention should be directed towards how members actions have evolved to keep up with the 
ever-changing political dynamics within the chamber, how they strategize to overcome institutional 
barriers to their success, and how institutions respond to their increased influence on the legislative 
process. 
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Chapter 4: A Bridge Over Troubled Waters 
Cohesion, Concordance, and Congressional Coalition Building in Racialized Policy Areas 
 
 
Introduction 
For members of color in Congress, coalitions are a necessity for achieving policy gains. Despite 
their increases in proportionality, no one minority group has amassed enough membership to 
invoke their will on the general body. Therefor, it is necessary for underrepresented members to 
form coalition networks to achieve their collective goals, to overcome entrenched interests that 
work against substantive policy change, and drive institutional attention towards the issues that 
plague the communities that they represent. Diversity within a coalition - both in terms of 
partisanship and identity - sends positive messages to leadership as to the prospects of success and 
the breadth of support within the chamber. Thus, it is necessary for members to reach out to build 
upon their coalition by appealing to other actors.  
For more than four decades, the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC) has been central to 
the collective representation of traditionally marginalized populations while also serving as an 
organizational tool to navigate an institution that may be hostile towards the particular policies they 
seek to advance. The organization is tasked with “calling attention to problems which need to be 
addressed, developing substantive and procedural expertise among members, and promoting the 
integrated consideration of policy proposals” (Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985; 428). 
However, little scholarship exists that is designed to examine how organizations comprised of 
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marginalized groups - like the CBC - employ collective strategies to drive institutional attention 
towards targeted interest. 
Generally, as a starting point, legislative actors can rely on co-members of their political 
party to build support. However, for the Congressional Black Caucus, some argue that a racialized 
agenda may be working against their legislative success; because of the nature of many of their 
policy aims, they have long struggled to gain substantive support from those members who have 
traditionally held the most leverage over the political process even within their own party structure 
(Bratton and Haynie 1999; Mansbridge 1999; Pitkin 1967; Wilson 2010; Frymer 2010; Frymer 2010; 
Singh 1998; Tate 2014; Swain 1993). Tate (2014) contends, as a product of organizational, 
ideological and generational transformations within the chamber, it may be the case that times have 
changed - that non-minority members within the party may be more responsive to the pursuits of 
Black lawmakers in the House of Representatives than in years past. However, she concedes, her 
methodology and data could not support any tests to the second presumption of this theory - that 
non-minority Democrats may be increasingly accommodating to Black interests (Tate 2014, 140). 
The Black Caucus has certainly improved its positioning within the chamber in the modern 
Congress. Following an extended period of Republican control, the CBC emerged with new-found 
leverage over lawmaking in the House of Representatives. I look to expand the discipline’s 
understanding of how the most formal mobilizations of marginalized representatives work to 
influence the legislative agenda and promote group-specific issues. Here, I employ useful tools of 
social network analysis to examine how coalitions built on racialized elements on the CBC’s agenda 
have changed from the 103rd through the 110th congresses and find evidence that supports Tate’s 
presumption that non-minority Democrats are becoming increasingly supportive of Black issue 
proposals. These results suggest that chamber conditions shifted during the extended stint in the 
minority; the Congressional Black Caucus has certainly improved in its ability to recruit reliable 
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support for legislation sponsored in areas specifically targeted by the organization over time, 
presenting a path forward for increased effectiveness in achieving the organization’s substantive 
policy goals. Not only had caucus members increased their influence within the party and chamber 
by the 110th, there appears to have been new-found support from their in-party colleagues that did 
not exist in past Democratic majorities. 
 
Building Coalitions around Racialized Policy Issues 
The ability to set agendas in Congress is largely dependent on an entity’s ability to relay signals to 
the institution and key decision makers about both relevant problems to be addressed as well as 
the preferred solutions to those problems and drive Congressional attention (Baumgartner and 
Jones 1991; Baumgartner and Jones 1993; (Krehbiel 1995; Jones and Baumgartner 2005). A 
considerable amount of scholarship has been dedicated to decoding cosponsorship patterns in 
legislative bodies, most of which has concentrated on individual characteristics and partisan 
affiliation as determining factors. In general, ideology, tenure, committee membership and 
positioning, expertise, and electoral prospects all shape cosponsorship patterns in the House of 
Representatives (Krehbiel 1995; Wilson and Young 1997; Campbell 1982; Bratton and Rouse 2011; 
Koger 2003; Fowler 2006a; Fowler 2006b). It is important, however, to re-engage the conversation 
surrounding the collective value of coasponsorship and coalition building, particularly as a 
signalling mechanism for the promotion of racialized policy issues. As Mintrom and Norman (2009, 
653)argue, the signals relayed by coalitions serve to cut through institutional barriers that exist 
within the chamber: 
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“The size of a coalition can be crucial for demonstrating the degree of support a proposal for policy change 
enjoys. Just as importantly, the composition of a coalition can convey the breadth of support for a proposal 
[and] help to deflect the arguments of opponents of change.” 
 
American political institutions have developed a centuries-long rigidity to racial 
advancement that has, at the very least, remained a steady undercurrent in a number of policy areas 
and, at most, a codified and institutionally reinforced reality in our nation’s darkest times. As a 
result, the quest for policy change in minority interest areas is likely to induce conflict - reducing 
the likelihood that these issues will be taken up in a serious fashion (Lowi 1964; Polsby 1968; 
Schattschneider 1975; Peterson 2012; Dawson and Cohen 2002). Congress is also plagued with 
limited attention, limited time, and a multitude of issues that compete for congressional attention 
(Jones 2003; Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Baumgartner and Jones 2015). The complexity of 
minority issues - and the institutional costs associated with identifying, attending to, and solving 
such problems - may reinforce inattentiveness to minority issue areas (Baumgartner et al. 2009). To 
accommodate, the institution routinely de-prioritizes minority issues to address what they perceive 
to be more pressing issues or those that are less demanding (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Frymer 
2010; Frymer 2011). 
For minority members of Congress, the task of driving legislative attention towards 
racialized policy issues may ultimately require collective action to overcome institutional friction 
associated with competing interests as well as institutional limitations - like time, resources, 
information, attention, and influence - that are constantly at play (Baumgartner and Jones 1991; 
Jones and Baumgartner 2005; Rohde 1994; Rohde 2010). A diverse coalition of cosponsors conveys 
to a number of messages. First, a bipartisan coalition suggest that a particular bill will face little 
resistance as it progresses through each stage of the process. The same could be said about a diverse 
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set of endorsers that span the spectrum of ideology; a bill that satisfies both the moderate and 
extreme members of the chamber is likely see limited opposition. Primary sponsors not only seek 
out diverse support in terms of party affiliation, some proposals depend on the recruitment of 
support from individuals with influence within the chamber. One way to bolster the chances of 
success is to gain approval from members with a perceived expertise in a relevant area (Koger 
2003). Another means rests in the ability to garner support directly from the most influential 
members, themselves. However, it has been shown across a number of studies that both leadership 
and the most seasoned members are routinely stingy with their selection of bills that they lend 
support to (Wilson and Young 1997, Rocca and Sanchez 2008). Koger (2003) found in interviews 
with staff and membership that both of these factors can influence scheduling, deliberation, and 
the leadership’s perspective on a particular proposal. 
 
Coalitional Support of Black Interests 
Political and social climates can shape a member’s ability to gain coalitional support. Compound 
that reality with the notion that core beliefs often serve as a foundation upon which coalitions are 
built, and that these core beliefs permeate across virtually all policy areas (Sabatier 1988; Sabatier 
and Weible 2014). These core policy beliefs are often driven by cultural components that “underpin 
the policy core beliefs around which advocacy coalitions form and fracture” (Ripberger et al. 2014; 
524). The very nature of the Congressional Black Caucus suggests that they are charged with 
tackling policy issues that are, by definition, coated in racial and ethnic overtones. Therefore, it is 
likely the makeup of these coalitions will vary from issue to issue. For Black representatives, the 
inability to forge diverse coalitions has long impeded the group’s success (Swain 1993; Singh 1998; 
Tate 2014) 
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In a political environment that is characterized by limited agenda access and, 
consequentially, low political incentives to defect, group members are able to coalesce around 
collective ideas more so than on concrete, structured proposals. The notion of “collective ideas” has 
been discussed among various scholars over the years. Sabatier’s (1988; 1993) Advocacy Coalition 
framework proposes policy-centered coalitions converge on a value-dependent hierarchical “deep 
core” belief system that is then encapsulated in and transformed into specific policy demands. Hall 
(1993) engages “policy paradigms” - frameworks of policy-specific goals, instruments for attaining 
those goals, and collective efforts to define the nature of policy problems. Legro (2000) defines 
“collective ideas” as a “self-confirming” and “enduring dominant mode of societal thought on 
appropriate action in a particular issue domain”. However, the pursuit of collective ideas of 
traditionally marginalized populations face an uphill battle in institutions designed to mitigate 
conflict and preserve structures of institutionalized power (Schattschneider 1975; Polsby 1968). 
 
In-Group Support 
Like most coalitions, the caucus identifies and prioritizes policy proposals that align with 
their “normative and ontological axioms” (Sabatier 1988, 145). On a structural level, The CBC is 
organized in a manner to facilitate the promotion of targeted issues onto the larger agenda. To 
accomplish this, they establish policy-specific working groups and taskforces manned by 
representatives that have particular interests or advantageous assignments within institution which 
increase their ability to gain favorable outcomes. They also have at their disposal externally funded 
institutes tasked with research responsibilities, community outreach, and information dissemination 
in their areas of interest. From a more strategic perspective, the caucus openly lobbies leadership 
for committee placements,1 develops direct lines of communication with the executive branch, and 
operate and maintain connections to the mass public through network and social media as well as 
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publishing their legislative agenda on the Congressional Record (Stevens, Mulhollan, and Rundquist 
1981; Hammond, Mulhollan, and Stevens 1985). As the caucus formalizes many of these features, 
it is reasonable to expect that increased cohesion in support of key issues should follow. 
Members of color work to increase the visibility of conditions that plague the constituencies 
they represent and translate their long-held grievances into substantive policy change. While some 
issues actively work to constrict the scope of conflict, “ideas concerning equality, consistency, equal 
protection of the laws, justice, liberty, freedom of movement, freedom of speech and association, 
and civil rights tend to socialize conflict” and appeal to new actors (Schattschneider 1975, 7). While 
in the minority party, a collective messaging campaign can also serve to establish a clear distinction 
between the disadvantaged group of legislators and those with control over the legislative agenda 
(Green 2015). By coalescing around a “clean, simple, and emotional” message while in the minority 
party, the Black Caucus may be able to force the majority party - and even unsupportive members 
of the Democratic party to take potentially difficult positions on racialized policies, even in the 
absence of formal institutional action on those policies (Green 2015; 80). 
In-group cohesion comes with very distinct advantages. In addition to previously-
mentioned impacts on messaging, in-group solidarity provides for efficient and trustworthy 
information sharing, builds a psychological support system and aids in the development of 
camaraderie, and provides a show of force within the institution (Pinney and Serra 2002; Gile and 
Jones 1995; Kingdon 2011; Victor 2018). At its core, the Black Caucus is understood to be a 
cohesive organization. In floor procedures, much of that influence rests in their propensity to make 
up a reliable, unified voting block; the caucus routinely uses in-group cohesion to endorse policy 
proposals, gain leverage over vote outcomes, and relay messages to key decision-makers in the 
chambers of Congress (Pinney and Serra 1999; Mixon and Pagels 2007; Mixon and Ressler 2001; 
Jones 1987; Gile and Jones 1995; Canon 1995; Tate 2003; Tate 2014). It is not unlikely that the 
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caucus employs strategies that play on such a cohesiveness in procedures other than floor votes to 
relay similar messages. Therefore, I anticipate: 
 
Hypothesis 1 In-group cohesion will be a dominant feature in cosponsorship networks of Black-interest bills 
sponsored by Congressional Black Caucus members. 
 
Out-group Support 
Until recently, a number of scholars have chronicled the propensity for out-group 
Democrats to avoid entangling themselves in core issues that uniquely plague the Black community 
(Frymer 2010; Frymer 2011; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Griffin and Keane 2011). As previously 
mentioned, this response - or lack thereof - to minority issues is institutionalized even within the 
political party that has, for more than seventy years, enjoyed the near unfailing political support for 
their party’s candidates at local, state, and federal levels. Such a lag in responsiveness has become 
routine in Congress and is evident within interparty dynamics. A difference in committee 
assignments of racial-minority members may be the product of Democratic leadership’s fear of 
electoral backlash from white voters (Griffin and Keane 2011). Frymer (2011, 2) attributes the 
decline of the labor movement that, for decades, fueled Democratic coalitions at local and federal 
levels to “a political system that, in its efforts to appeal to civil rights opponents, created a bifurcated 
system of power that assigned race and class problems to different spheres of government”. 
However, scholars point to potential paths forward for breaking down barriers in party support for 
their racialized agenda. 
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Concordance and Coalition Building 
Leading into the 104th Congress, Robert Singh (1998) identified two primary challenges to 
the CBC’s ability to obtain support from within Democratic allies. First, the radical and racialized 
“Black Agenda” of the caucus made political collaboration unappealing to their in-party colleagues. 
Second, he argues limited popular support for the CBC’s proposals provide little incentive to lend 
their formal support to the caucus’ proposals. As a result, “Embracing the CBC’s agenda is hence 
strategically unappealing” (Singh 1998; 204). However, through an examination of voting behavior, 
Tate (2014) found that by the next Democratic majority, two phenomena may have occurred; as 
Black members seek out a more pragmatic approach to policy solutions and the non-minority 
members of the Democratic Party become more embracing of a progressive agenda, the two groups 
may be converging in their support of racialized policy areas. 
The liberalization of the Democratic party is not a new phenomenon. For decades, scholars 
have pointed to increasing levels of polarization within Congress that often leads to legislative 
impasse - especially when it comes to racialized policy issues (Butler 2009; Hacker and Pierson 
2006; Jones 2001; Neal 2018). Most have identified asymmetric trends in polarization largely 
characterized by Republicans moving towards the conservative extremes. However, the increased 
liberalization of the Democratic party - as slight as it may be could have bearings on the direction 
of the party’s responsiveness to Black issues. Strong polarization found in the most recent 
congressional terms have led to an increase in cohesive in-group tie formation in cosponsorship 
networks (Neal 2018). As a result, non-minority Democrats may be moving closer to developing 
an ideological consensus in racialized policy areas with their inter-party counterparts. 
If a lack of minority issue salience and preferences served as barriers to coalition building 
among elected officials, as Singh (1998) suggests, things have also changed significantly over time. 
Racialized issues are becoming increasingly salient, and new generations of voters are increasingly 
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adopting more racially progressive preferences (Maxwell and Schulte 2018). Ignoring racial 
inequality could result in changes in partisan attachment and result in long-term consequences 
(Carmines and Stimson 1989; Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006). Additionally, congressional 
districts are rapidly changing. Redistricting in the 2000’s has altered district compositions - and 
likely the aims of those seeking to satisfy the electoral motivation commonly associated with elected 
officials (Mayhew 1974). In addition, black mobility, rapid suburbanization and gentrification have 
drastically altered the political landscape - and likely district demands - for the foreseeable future 
(Rogers 2018; McGowen 2018). If legislators take cues from the voting public, an increased support 
for racialized issues could be the by-product of changing tides among a liberalized Democratic 
base. 
An emerging line of scholarship argues new generations of Black representatives are 
moving away from racially contentious policy areas and, instead, are pursuing “policies of 
commonality” (Canon 1995; Gillespie 2010; Gillespie 2012). This line of research contends a shift in 
substantive goals towards a more de-racialized policy agenda may be well underway. This evolution 
may be rooted in a number of factors including a progressive tilt in within the Democratic party, 
shifting demographics within their respective congressional districts, or just a general shift in 
personal preferences. Canon (1995) identified trends shaping within the Caucus in the early 1990’s 
that signaled a change in tactics was near. He predicted divergent paths emerging between first 
generation members of the CBC - who rose to legislative power from the Civil Rights Movement 
and the black church - and the (then) incoming class of lawmakers who got their starts in city and 
state governments. Those freshmen lawmakers - two decades later - are now the old guard, and a 
third generation of Black Caucus members appear to be following that trend. 
Since Canon’s work, a number of scholars have traced the emergence of black elected 
officials from local and state offices to federal positions and the impact of their experience on the 
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progressive, universalized policy pursuits. Gillespie (2010; 2012) argues generational progress any 
of the new generation of Black lawmakers are Ivy League-educated (compared to the products of 
Historically Black Colleges), suburban (rather than urban) raised, and socialized in the age of 
modern technology and inclusivity (in comparison to those brought up in the contentiousness of 
the Civil Rights era). Along with these differences, the new generation brings with them a new style 
of political leadership that appears to de-emphasize racial and ethnic difference in lieu of a more 
pragmatic agenda. 
A moderation of the Congressional Black Caucus away from a racially radical ”Black 
Agenda” and towards one driven by commonality combined with a liberalization of the remaining 
Democratic caucus may result in increased collaboration in CBC proposals and initiatives. This 
study looks to step in to provide empirical support to an otherwise well-founded theory of 
concordance. While examinations of voting behavior may not be sufficient, a methodological 
approach designed to test supportive ties over time is better suited to gauge shifts in support for 
racialized policy proposals. Support for Tate’s theory would be provided by a simultaneous increase 
in (1) of out-group Democratic support and (2) an ideological similarity within the network. To test 
these propositions, I offer the following hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2 Members who are ideologically similar will be more likely to share support in CBC-sponsored 
legislation in targeted areas. 
 
Diversity Infrastructure Hypotheses 
In their advocacy of racialized policy issues, the Black Caucus faces two realities. First, their 
relatively small proportionality virtually mandates a need to expand the scope to potential allies 
within the chamber or face certain defeat (Schattschneider 1975; Guinier 1991). Second, the nature 
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of the caucuses policy concerns is drenched in potentially contentious and divisive subject matter 
that threatens to break down party-line coalitions. With this in mind, one must assume that the 
pursuit of racialized policy issues could cause partisan cohesion to deteriorate, thus, making it 
necessary to devise a targeted strategy of coalition building that reaches beyond party labels and 
looks to take advantage of racial and gender identity within the chamber (Browning, Marshall, and 
Tabb 1986). The fate of their coalitions may rest on the ability to draw support from extra-party 
organizations that are similarly aligned around racial or gender identity. 
The idea that marginalized groups are inclined to share a consensus around normative ideals 
like social justice, equality, and fairness is certainly not a novel one. Scholars have long examined 
the notion that political perception of marginalized groups center around the concept of a “linked 
fate” that is often shared within and across different racial and gender identity groups (Dawson 
1995; Dawson 2003; Tyson 2016). Members of underrepresented groups routinely perceive a 
degree of connectedness in their political conditions and a shared marginalized experience in the 
representation of their interests and influence on political processes. Additionally, the 
marginalization of identity groups are routinely the product of political decisions in policy areas 
that cut across the interest multiple racial and gender such as healthcare, social welfare, and 
education (Bratton and Haynie 1999; Swers 2002; Swers 2005). While several studies have identified 
how such a perception of linked fate may shape mass political behavior, considerations of how this 
interconnectivity can influence behavior and motivations by actors within political institutions are 
less plentiful. Bratton and Haynie (1999 as well as Bratton and Rouse 2011) tackle this question by 
examining how overlapping policy interest shape member behavior in state legislatures. They find 
that racial and gender identity can not only shape bill sponsorship activity - where Black members 
sponsor bills commonly associated with women’s policy issues and vice versa - but their identities 
can drive collaboration through legislative cosponsorship. 
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Minta and Sinclair-Chapman (2013) point to the formalization not just of the Congressional 
Black Caucus, but a system of interconnected racial and gender identity caucuses designed to 
promote underrepresented issues onto the congressional agenda. These organizations - complete 
with crafted legislative agendas, strategic organizational features like taskforces and working groups, 
and increasing memberships - have developed into formidable legislative forces, particularly in the 
lower chamber where their presence as reliable voting blocs, growing committee coverage, and 
increasing political incorporation into committee and party leadership have provided these 
otherwise marginalized members with resources that could be used to leverage the legislative 
process. Additionally, concurrent memberships highlight intersectional policy issues and provide 
an outlet for potential collaboration and coalition building. Tyson’s extensive elite interviewing 
provides a great deal of support for the idea that linked political fate drives a more formal 
collaboration between congressional organizations comprised of representatives from marginalized 
identity groups who find “a decided utility in building alliances between and among marginalized 
groups as a means to amass critical numbers in the majority rule system” (Tyson 2016, 51). It is not 
unreasonable to expect Black Caucus members to seek more co-sponsorship opportunities with 
lawmakers from other racial and gender groups on issues where their interests align. With this in 
mind, I offer a hypothesis that focuses on the relationship between these marginalized groups, the 
interests they pursue, and their cosponsorship interactions: 
 
 
Hypothesis 3 Members of racial and gender-identity caucuses will be more active in cosponsorship networks formed 
around racialized policy areas than noncaucus members. 
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A Network Modeling of Black-interest Support 
To examine issue support for Black-interest policies, I employ social network analysis 
techniques on cosponsorship patterns from the 103rd through the 110th Congress. A network 
approach provides a unique perspective into factors that drive caucus collaboration. At the state 
level, Bratton and Rouse (2011) expand on our understanding of racial drivers of cosponsorship 
by calling on a small-world network analysis application to behavior at the state level. While they 
find that homophily and transitivity shape tendencies for minority members to form cosponsorship 
ties (Bratton and Rouse 2011), it is likely that those dyadic ties fail to fully capture the entire story. 
In addition to the numerous disadvantages that exist within the institution, Black members are 
disproportionately impacted by race-based assortative mixing (Craig et al. 2015). The pursuit of 
core issues is further complicated by the potential that that those tasked with seeking out 
substantive policy change may be going at it alone. If this is indeed the case, it is important to 
understand the collective strategies employed to maximize their effectiveness. 
I am particularly interested in the degree of support for key issues on the CBC agenda. I 
identify seven distinct domestic policy areas of interest targeted by the CBC taskforce system: the 
Economic Development, Civil and Voting Rights, Criminal Justice Reform, Education and Labor, the Healthcare, 
Poverty Reduction, and the Technology taskforces2. I then turn to expressed agenda of the caucus - 
published both through their official website and in the Congressional record - and extrapolate 
fourty-four unique minor policy areas that have been explicitly communicated by the caucus as 
areas of interest and categorize them according to the Comparative Agendas Project coding 
scheme. Table 1 organizes the most clearly defined targeted policy areas of interest by their 
respective taskforce jurisdictions and aims. 
I identify a total of 1,031 individual bills that fall within the purview of the fourty-four 
minor topic areas explicitly targeted in CBC agenda that were sponsored by Black Caucus members 
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from the 103rd through 110th Congress. Figure 1 reveals these two trends in bill activity 
surrounding targeted policy areas. Black Caucus members to decrease their overall output in the 
number of bills sponsored. This could likely be the result of a number of factors including a cost-
benefit analysis associated with sponsoring bills in the minority party (Schiller 1995; Rocca and 
Gordon 2010), the disruptive nature of Gingrich-era reforms (Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Singh 
1998), or the depletion of institutional resources allocated to the caucus as it transitioned from LSO 
to a more informal organization (Clarke 2018). However, those bills remained a significant portion 
of the overall sponsorship. While Black members decrease primary sponsorship in key areas of 
interest, those issues account for a slightly larger proportion of their legislative focus. In addition, 
the number of average cosponsors increased following the transition into Republican control.  
Among the twenty most supported bills associated with the caucus’ agenda include a bill 
“to provide Federal assistance to States and local jurisdictions to prosecute hate crimes” in the 
108th (178 Cosponsors), legislation in the 107th Congress designed to protect voting rights (168), 
and a bill sponsored “to prohibit racial profiling” in the 108th (127). There were also seven bills 
directly related to either public K-12 or higher education included in the twenty-most cosponsored 
bills. Aside from a sharp decline in the 104th Congress - likely a product of the disruptive nature 
of Gingrich era reforms - cosponsorship was relatively stable across the sample (Figure 1C). When 
it comes to promoting black issues while in the minority, it is also expected that Black members, 
then, consolidate their cosponsorship efforts. 
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Table 1: This table identifies issues of interest for the Congressional Black Caucus. Comparative 
Agendas Project (CAP) minor topics codes are included for reference. 
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Figure 1: Descriptive statistics of bill sponsorships and cosponsorships from the 103rd - 110th 
Congress. 
 
 
Data and Network Formation 
To identify each of the unique cosponsors that engage within a particular policy area, I call 
upon GovTrack cosponsorship data. I construct an undirected affiliation matrix where House 
members j are associated with CBC-member-sponsored bills i within that policy topic. A solitary 
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act of cosponsorship does not say much about coalitions within the chamber; this is especially true 
when these bills are in potentially contentious, racialized policy areas. There exists a need to move 
beyond the casual ties that routinely form within the chamber. To tease out trends that resemble a 
more firm commitment to the respective policy area and the efforts of the Black Caucus and its 
membership, I elect to include a set of models of cosponsorship that restricts network formation 
to include only those that have formed ties in at least five-percent and ten-percent (rounding up) 
of the total bills sponsored in the given policy area. 
Thresholding is a common practice when analyzing cosponsorship networks (Fowler 
2006a; Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). The decision to set the threshold at five and tenpercent is 
not an arbitrary one - Cranmer and Desmarais (2011, 78) find thinning thresholds up to 10% 
“produce reasonably dense networks capturing between 20% and 50% of all possible ties”. With 
the aim of creating the most rigorous threshold possible while preserving enough ties to conduct 
empirical analysis, I tested thresholds from five to fifteen-percent. At the levels above 10 percent 
threshold, sparsity in the 104th Congress rendered any temporal analysis impossible. 
 
Model Selection for Temporal Network Analysis 
Given the aim of this study to identify relational ties that drive these specific issue coalitions over 
time, I employ a temporal exponential random graph model with bootstrapped confidence intervals 
(BTERGM) to account for the interdependent nature of cosponsorship within the chamber 
(Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 2018). The pooled, cross-sectional BTERGM accounts for the 
impact of exogenous factors while measuring the impact of endogenous factors across multiple 
networks. The dependent variables in this instance are the observed networks across targeted policy 
areas, and the estimation predicts the probability of observing this configuration across all possible 
configuration given the variables of interest. 
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Figure 2: Moderate Cooperation - The figure above displays cosponsorship networks formed 
from CBC-Member sponsored bills in racialized policy areas at the five-percent threshold. 
 
Figure 3: Frequent Cooperation - The figure above displays cosponsorship networks formed 
from CBC-Member sponsored bills in racialized policy areas at the ten-percent threshold. 
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The BTERGM employs maximum pseudolikelihood estimation (MPLE) of each model for 
four specific reasons. The first is capability. While the use of Monte Carlo maximum likelihood 
(MCMLE) estimates are traditionally used in the estimation of ERGM models, they become 
computationally challenging when attempting to handle larger and/or denser networks. The act of 
cosponsorship is a process that can easily produce tens of thousands of ties within a given policy 
area and session, rendering the standard MCMLE modeling relatively insufficient (Fowler 2006b). 
The second advantage comes in its efficiency: MPLE models are able to handle what would be 
arduous tasks for MCMLE in a fraction of the time. The third factor is the model’s flexibility. The 
BTERGM model is designed specifically to handle nodes entering and exiting the cosponsorship 
network (Leifeld, Cranmer, and Desmarais 2018). Therefore any breakdowns in relational ties 
resulting from turnover or an expansion, for example, would be accounted for in this analysis. 
Finally, there is a potential advantage with MPLE when it comes to accuracy. The psuedolikelihood 
model produces estimates on par - if not better - than those produced by Monte Carlo simulations, 
especially as node sizes increase (Schmid and Desmarais 2017). On the surface, the MPLE rendition 
of the ERGM model ultimately reduces nicely to a Logistic Regression. However, one disadvantage 
of the MPLE ERGM and its temporal extensions is that it tends to underestimate corresponding 
confidence intervals (Schmid and Desmarais 2017). 
 
Variables of Interest 
The BTERGM is designed to identify structural and exogenous characteristics of multiple 
networks. I leverage this capability to examine the three features expected to contribute to support 
in Black-interest areas. I employ three sets of network analysis functions to determine the nature 
of collaboration in CBC interest areas. 
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CBC Cohesion 
Group cohesion is measured through the use of common applications of network analysis 
that have escaped similar questions concerning in-group issue support. The first measure is one of 
in-group cohesion. While various dyadic relational ties certainly influence the cosponsorship trends, 
I argue the ability to close those ties and form cohesive units around core policy issues that is 
expected to be the difference in sophisticated coalitions. Triadic formation is one way to examine 
cohesion within networks (Neal 2018). Bratton and Rousse (2011) find that group transitivity drives 
collaboration at the state level. To identify such relationships in the House of Representatives, I 
include a simple measure of this concept -triangles - to determine what extent that CBC members 
share collaborators based on existing in-group ties with other members of the organization. 
Ideological Concordance 
Tate argues that an ideological convergence between the CBC and non-CBC members of 
the Democratic part could lead to increased collaboration in Black-interest areas. This two-stage 
process that she labels concordance - characterized by an ideological moderation of the Black Caucus 
and a simultaneous liberalization of non-CBC Democrats - would likely provide an opportunity for 
the caucus “to knit together the broad coalitions necessary to win passage of liberal social and 
economic policies” (Tate 2014, 148). To test this theory, I include a measure of the influence of 
difference between two lawmakers’ ideology according to Poole and Rosenthal’s (2000) DW-
Nominate score. 
 
Diversity Infrastructures 
Scholars contend the presence of identity-based caucuses may provide CBC members with 
an additional avenue to build coalitions within the chamber. While there are several types of 
legislative caucuses – including those associated with party, shared issue interests, and geographic 
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location (see Hammond, et al. (1985) for complete typology) – the type most relevant to this study 
are those that are formed to promote interests of specific identity groups. I focus on two identity-
centric caucuses that could potentially serve as reliable allies for the CBC in their pursuit of 
racialized issues: the Congressional Hispanic Caucus (CHC) and the Congressional Caucus for 
Women’s Issues (CCWI). These groups have grown to constitute a significant portion of the 
representative body within the House and can shed light on the collective, potentially coordinated 
action of similar members. These groups also serve as the collective voice of their respective racial 
and gender identities within the chamber. Finally, over time, these groups have amassed a great 
deal of influence and visibility in the legislative process. Thus, it seems likely that these groups 
would see a great deal of opportunity to collaborate in search of shared policy goals. The nodefactor 
function of SNA is a means of determining influence of caucus membership on their 
connectedness. To test this assumption, I include variables designed to measure the activity levels 
of both CHC and CWI members in cosponsorship networks around CBC-intrest bills. 
 
Additional Considerations 
In addition to the key variables of interest, I include a number of variables widely believed 
to influence cosponsorship behavior. Across numerous studies, homophily, and tenure all shape 
cosponsorship patterns in the House of Representatives (Krehbiel 1995; Wilson and Young 
1997; Campbell 1982; Bratton and Rouse 2011; Koger 2003; Fowler 2006a; Fowler 2006b). In an 
effort to address the potential that social and general homophily shape ties between actors, I 
consider node matches where edge-ties are driven by similarities in members’ gender, home state, and 
party affiliation and seniority. Finally, I also account for several endogenous, network-level statistics 
designed to identify underlying trends in cosponsorship. I include two measures of triadic closure 
to serve both as a general measure of tendencies within the broader network and to control for 
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such a propensity to further highlight the in-group support on the part of the caucus. The first two 
are a measure of geometrically weighted edgewise shared partners (GWESP) and dyad-wise shared 
partners (GWDSP) designed to account for global clustering and closure in the broader network. 
I also include a commonly-utilized measure designed to capture the degree distribution of the 
network (GWDEGREE). Finally, the Edges term is a count of the number of ties found across the 
different networks. 
 
Results 
What factors shape support through cospsonsorship in Black-interest areas? Table 2 reveals 
coefficient measures across the sample of House cosponsorship activity, conditional on the 
remaining network endogenous and exogenous coefficients, along with 95% confidence intervals 
that surround the estimates. In each model, confidence intervals are the product of 1,000 
bootstrapped replications. Estimates are considered to be statistically significant if zero (0) falls 
outside of those intervals. Presented models are subject to standard degeneracy and goodness-of-
fit tests associated with social network analysis, and perform admirably in each. 
 
In-Group Support 
Findings from the models presented in Table 2 suggest that a combination of endogenous 
and exogenous factors shape cosponsorship pattern in bills sponsored by Congressional Black 
Caucus members in the organizations prioritized policy areas. First, as expected, caucus members 
utilize their strength in numbers to relay messages to key institutional decision makers. In-group 
cohesion - measured by the transitive nature of connections between CBC members - in both the 
moderate and frequent collaboration models suggest reveals cohesion and triadic closure prove to 
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be dominant characteristics of these support networks. The positive coefficient associated with this 
measure allows me to confidently reject the null hypothesis. However, these findings appear to be 
driven by extraordinary levels of cohesion following the 104th Congress - a period of significant 
change for the caucus and the institution broadly. 
 
 
Table 2: Results from the Bootstrapped Temporal Exponential Random Graph Model (BTERGM) 
 
Until the 104th Congress, the Congressional Black Caucus “enjoyed” Democratic rule for 
the entirety of the group’s existence. It was during this period that onlookers described the caucus 
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as a loosely-tied, relatively invisible, and often combative organization (Singh 1998; Smith 1996). 
However, the transition out of a sustained Democratic majority in the House to a six term 
dominance of House Republicans that ultimately reshaped lawmaking within the institution and 
for the Black Caucus. Figure 4 suggests that the level of cohesion that scholars often point to in 
their voting patterns (Pinney and Serra 1999; Mixon and Pagels 2007; Mixon and Ressler 2001; 
Jones 1987; Gile and Jones 1995; Canon 1995; Tate 2003; Tate 2014) was not evident in their 
cosponsorship behavior from the 103rd and 104th Congresses. In fact, only 72 and 9 of the 
potential ties, respectively, were formed at the frequent cosponsorship threshold. The 104th 
Congress appears to be especially disruptive to collective behavior - likely as a product of large scale 
institutional reform following the first shift in partisan control of the House of Representatives in 
decades. Consequentially, and unsurprisingly, cosponsorship in the 104th reflected a caucus in 
disarray - characterized by very little cohesion. 
On the first day of the 104th Congress, the House - led by newly appointed Speaker Newt 
Gingrich - passed sweeping rules changes aimed at increasing transparency, reducing operating 
costs, and reducing legislative inefficiencies perceived to exist prior to the shift in majority control 
of the House. Scholars point to a number of reforms over the years that have directly contributed 
to the a general decline in analytic capacity and decentralization of the House of Representatives 
(Aldrich and Rohde 1997; Schickler 2001; Adler 2002; Rohde 2010; Adler and Wilkerson2011; 
Baumgartner and Jones 2015). Those impacts reverberate even after a transition back into 
Democratic control in the 110th, especially for the Black Caucus   
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Figure 4: The figure above displays cosponsorship networks formed from CBC-Member sponsored 
bills in racialized policy areas at the ten-percent threshold. 
Analysis from Andrew Clarke found that the abolishment greatly decreased the legislative 
capacity of LSO members and destabilized legislative networks (Clarke 2018). “Republican 
leadership abruptly dismantled a system of directly funded political institutions in the 104th 
Congress, and LSO chairs, accustomed to directing considerable resources towards their 
organization’s legislative agenda, were sent scrambling for alternative financial arrangements” 
(Clarke 2018, 19). Abolishing LSOs in the 104th Congress had a distinct impact on the 
Congressional Black Caucus, an organization that appeared to finally hit its stride after just over 20 
103rd Congress 104th Congress
105th Congress 106th Congress
107th Congress 108th Congress
109th Congress 110th Congress
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years in existence. In Peacock Elite, Black Caucus workhorse, Rep. Major Owens (D-NY) asserted 
the decision to dismantle the LSO network in the House was motivated – at least in part – by 
Gingrich’s personal hostility towards the caucus and a fear of the organization reaching its potential 
(Owens 2011, 207): 
“ While the CBC interference with traditional power manipulation was viewed as a 
nuisance by the Democratic leadership, the Republican Speaker elected in 1995 
surmised that the CBC was for other reasons a major threat to his agenda. Newt 
Gingrich clearly saw the CBC as a mobilizing force with far greater potential than 
it had yet realized. Of still greater importance he saw it as a highly visible model 
with considerable embryonic replication already germinating. Having utilized a 
special, though less visible, caucus process to elevate himself to power, Speaker 
Gingrich understood the threats of the caucus format to his ambitious agenda and 
moved to destroy it.” 
 
Singh (1998) chronicles the challenges directly associated with the 104th Congress. The 
caucus struggled to regain resources (funding, staff, and information) that came as a result of 
organizational restructuring and a diminished overall legislative capacity (Owens 2011; Clarke 
2018).The organizational agenda, itself, appears to have been negatively impacted by the disruptive 
nature of the reforms associated with the Republican’s “Contract” reforms. Singh (1998, 194) 
comments, “the CBC seemed unable to come to a collective view of what Blacks’ permanent 
interests were, much less on how best to realize them”. As a result, the caucus was faced with a 
need to revisit its legislative strategy. However, the caucus devised creative means to respond to 
Gingrich’s mandates. According to Rep. Owens’ view from the inside, “Instead of destroying the 
CBC, Gingrich’ decrees had only crippled it, forced a creative mutation” (Owens 2011, 207). These 
findings suggest, one such way that the caucus responded to Gingrich era reforms was to employ 
a cohesive collective messaging strategy through legislative cosponsorship when sponsoring 
legislation in key policy areas. 
A brief glance networks’ graph density - a measure of the total number of observed edges 
divided by the total number of edges possible based on the number of nodes in a network over the 
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time span in question, cosponsorship networks at the ten-percent threshold were far more dense 
in the 105th Congress (0.823) compared to the previous session (0.019). Although the density of 
in-group support networks experienced a decline in the following years, they still remained 
relatively high in comparison to both the 104th Congress and the bracketing periods of Democratic 
majorities. This could signal a period of strategic evolution within the organization that took place 
once the initial shock of minority party status resided. First, this could be the product the re-
emergence of a legislative agenda - something the organization seemed to lack in the 104th. Second, 
the lag in activity could be the product of a more formalized messaging strategy that came in 
response to the shock of settling into a Republican majority. Additional data would be needed to 
determine if this cohesion revealed in the network is merely a function of sampling or a more 
significant, long-term trend. 
 
 
Figure 5: In-group graph density as measured by the number of observed ties out of the total 
number of potential ties. 
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Out-Group Support of Black-interest Policies 
The CBC has increased in numbers since its inception. However, even at their most 
populous, the caucus lacks the ability to drive issue attention without the support of at least some 
of their colleagues in the chamber. Table 2 as well as Figures 2 and 3 reveal that support for CBC 
proposals in key areas is almost uniformly Democrat. This is especially true when examining the 
more frequent supporters of CBC issues. This is expected considering that the CBC is, in large part, 
an organization of Black Democrats.3 What, then, besides partisan affiliation contributes to support 
for Black-interest policies? 
 
Ideological Concordance and Coalition Building 
Katherine Tate (2014) posited that and ideological convergence between the Black Caucus 
and the remaining Democrats in the House would provide an opportunity to build supportive 
relationships that may bleed over into Black-interest policy areas. Figure 6 visualizes this process 
that she calls concordance - characterized by a gradual moderation of Black Caucus members and a 
more asymmetric liberalization of the rest of the Democratic Party. Hypothesis 2 supposes that 
this meeting of the ideological minds would become a dominant predictor in edge formation in 
this sample of cosponsorship networks. As Table 2 reveals, ideological homophily is significant 
predictor of coalitional support for bills sponsored by Congressional Black Caucus members. The 
negative coefficient associate with the absolute difference of members’ DW-Nominate score 
indicates that edge formation is more prevalent when two members are closer in ideology. This 
finding holds across both the five and ten-percent thresholds. These finding provide a great deal 
of support for Tate’s theory and should prove promising for Black lawmakers seeking a broader, 
more diverse coalition. 
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Figure 6: Ideological convergence of CBC members and the remaining Democratic Party members 
from the 103rd - 110th Congress. 
 
 
Diversity Infrastructures and Coalition Building 
Scholars also point to a potential cooperation between identity caucuses that could lead to 
an increased level of support in Black-interest legislation (Minta and Sinclair-Chapman 2013; Tyson 
2016). To test this theory, I examine the degree to which members of the Congressional Hispanic 
Caucus (CHC) and the Caucus for Womens’ Issues (CWI) are connected in the CBC bill 
cosponsorship networks. Contrary to expectations, analysis of the cosponsorship patterns indicate 
that these relationships do not necessarily drive tie formation. In their state-level analysis, Bratton 
and Haynie (1999) find that their is a great deal of overlap in the policy interests that impact Black 
and Women communities. There is also a great deal of overlap in the memberships of the two 
caucuses, as Black women (and women, in general) are in creasing their presence within the 
chamber. This could have the potential to spawn collaboration between the two caucus designed 
to promote those issues in the House of Representatives. However, Table 2 indicates that that 
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bond may not be as strong as some would presume when it comes to supporting a Black-interest 
agenda. The coefficient designed to measure the connectedness of CWI members only reaches 
traditional measures of statistical significance in the moderate cosponsorship model (Model 2). 
That influence on the cosponsorship vanishes when increasing the threshold of tie formation from 
five to ten-percent of bills sponsored in Black-interest areas by CBC members (Model 4). 
The models provide even less support for the idea that Black and Latinx members of 
Congress will create reliable bonds when sponsoring racialized legislation. Although it would 
appear on the surface that there would be a great deal of overlap in their legislative agendas, CHC 
influence does not appear to have a significant impact on the cosponsorship networks at either 
threshold. This comes despite being a member of the Tri-Caucus - a coalition with the CBC and 
the Asian and Pacific Americans Caucus. Previous scholarship from authors such as Rodney Hero 
(2013) and Vanessa C. Tyson (2016) propose that this relationship between Black and Latinx 
representatives may be much more contingent. Which brings me to ponder on some of the reasons 
that this data may produce these somewhat surprising outcomes with respect to cross-caucus 
support. 
While these models do not necessarily test this presumption, it may be the case that 
crosscaucus support may be more dependent on particular issues where there is a more direct 
correlation between the groups’ interests. There may also be more of an interplay between the 
caucus that considers a more strategic relationship where this cooperation across identity caucuses 
only plays out when a member in a more advantaged position within the chamber hierarchy. These 
two ideas could prove fruitful ground for future studies. 
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Additional Findings 
The structural variables presented in Table 2 provide additional context around the 
cosponsorship networks in Black sponsored Black-interest legislation. The negative, significant 
coefficients associated Edges term indicate that each of the networks are less dense than a graph 
drawn at random given the number of nodes present. This shows one reality of Blackinterest 
advocacy in the House of Representatives: members of Congress are overwhelmingly reluctant to 
support proposals on the CBC agenda. However, on the other hand, the positive coefficient 
associated with the GWESP term suggests those that do sign on to these bills are likely to form 
strong, transitive bonds with other cosponsors. Finally, geographic similarity also proves to predict 
edge formation. Members that share a home state are likely to cosponsor in the CBC-interest 
network. 
 
Discussion 
Ultimately, this analysis sought to achieve two goals. This work aspires to build upon 
scholarship that advocates moving beyond the dyadic model of representation and progress 
towards the collective representation of group interests. As Congress, and particularly the House 
of Representatives, becomes increasingly hostile to individual members impacting legislative 
outcomes - rather it be through the changing of rules, power-grabs by leadership, or the rise of 
ideological and partisan factions within the chamber - we must begin to sharpen our focus on 
actions taken by groups to achieve collective goals. Second, this project set out to expand our 
scholarly consideration of policy support beyond late-stage processes and identify trends in the 
legislative process that can contribute to our understanding of how groups pursue those collective 
interests, not just if they do. While studies that reveal cohesion among members in roll-call votes 
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certainly benefit our overall knowledge concerning the Black Caucus - and other groups like them 
- those findings do not relay the entire story. 
This article builds upon our knowledge of how identity caucuses - like the Congressional 
Black Caucus - work as a collective in an effort to promote key issues onto the legislative agenda. 
One means to forward issues onto an agenda is to relay messages that a subset of members possess 
intense preferences for (or against) a particular proposal. Another mode is to show that a proposal 
has broad and diverse support within the chamber. Thus, examining how caucus members form 
supportive ties in support of issues targeted by the organization is one of many ways to accomplish 
the two goals mentioned above. 
As Black lawmakers become increasingly creative in seeking out ways to break through 
institutional barriers of inattention, it will become necessary to move our scholarship towards 
examining these processes. Additionally, new empirical approaches to examining minority 
representation are also necessary to identify underlying trends, diagnose long-term phenomenon, 
and determine if and how conditions change for representatives of color and the institutions that 
house them. Network analysis provides a means to answer questions we may not have thought 
possible until now. Scholars interested in advancing our understanding of the behavior those who 
represent marginalized interests should invest in seeking out innovative ways to explore old and 
new questions. 
Cohesion is expected within and groups that are subject to marginalization both within and 
outside of political institutions (Dawson 1995; Neil Pinney and George Serra 1999; Tyson 2016). 
These findings suggest, when the odds are stacked against them and institutional resources are 
denied, the Congressional Black Caucus relies on cohesive messaging as a primary mode of agenda-
setting from the minority. However, out-group support is still hard to come by. I examine two 
potential pathways to build coalitions around CBC-interest proposals, with mixed findings. As 
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predicted, an ideological convergence between the Democratic Party and the CBC has shown to 
be a fruitful avenue to build bonds between members. Cross-caucus coalition building, however, 
does not appear to influence cosponsorship behavior in bills sponsored by Black Caucus members 
in targeted areas. 
This serves as just one of multiple means to examine issue support around policies that 
have the potential to change the lives of marginalized groups. Moving forward, additional attention 
should be devoted to determining if support is more contingent on a more granular consideration 
of policy area. There is also the possibility that support may fluctuate as members enter and exit 
the chamber majority. Additionally, special attention should be paid to a more strategic form of 
cross-caucus collaboration that may operate on member positioning within the chamber. Finally, 
interested scholars should consider a diverse set of methodological tools to gain leverage on these 
questions and possible answers. 
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Conclusion: (Re)Evaluating Collective Agenda-Setting in Black-
interest Policy Areas 
Towards a Better Understanding of the Modern Congressional Black Caucus 
 
 
This project began with three explicit goals in mind. First, I aimed to uncover how the CBC 
constructs and communicates their collective worldview to the institution. Existing literature has been 
essential to improving our understanding of how Black lawmakers behave in legislative bodies. 
However, it often falls short in considering, empirically, the contexts and commitments that are 
wrapped up in their agenda. Second, I sought to move beyond studying individualized legislative 
behaviors to examine how collective strategies are employed to promote their preferences onto the 
institution’s agenda. Finally, by working at the intersection of institutional and policy process literature 
and drawing on seldom-used methodological tools, I hoped to build on theoretical and empirical 
explorations into the representations of Black America in the House of Representatives.  
Chapter 2 examines the potential of evaluating floor speeches delivered with the intent of 
defining issues on their agenda. By defining policies according to their underlying attributes, Black 
lawmakers are able to shape policy images and shape – and potentially reshape – existing frames of 
policy issues that plague the communities that they represent. I also uncover that there is a decided 
utility in engaging in problem definition from a scholarly, organizational, and institutional perspective. 
A better understanding of issues provides policy actors a bit of clarity in taking on problems faced by 
Black Americans. 
In Chapter 3, I attempt to apply a theoretical explanation to changes in bill sponsorship trends 
in recent congressional sessions. I argue that the CBC a striking increase in legislation that receives 
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multiple committee referrals is tied to an effort to broaden the reach of legislation within the chamber. 
Through designing bills in a way that capitalizes on the multidimensional nature of Black interests, 
CBC lawmakers are able to seek out more favorable committees. Doing so increases the likelihood 
that these bills clear the committee stage. More importantly, CBC-sponsored bills that receive multiple 
referrals are more likely to receive favorable floor votes.  
Chapter 4 set out to explore how the Black Caucus responded to institutional adversity by 
building coalitions in the chamber. I find that the organization consolidated its messaging efforts 
through bill cosponsorship in the midst of a long-term stent in the minority party. The shift to 
Republican control and the subsequent, Gingrich-era institutional reforms, certainly proved disruptive 
to the practices of the caucus. However, in response, the caucus increased their cohesion around bills 
sponsored in CBC-interest policy areas sponsored by Black lawmakers. Caucus members also 
reconfigured who they formed cosponsorship bonds with. Prior to Republican control in the 104th 
Congress, the caucus was heavily reliant on CBC members that set atop committees. This can 
potentially free up committee chairs to do the work of the party while rank and file members can 
invest their time and effort into issue advocacy. I also trace patterns that shape outgroup support in 
CBC-interest areas.  Increasing ideological homopholy provides the most certain pathway to coalition 
building in the House of Representatives.  
Taken together, it is my hope that the preceding chapters serve as a first step in re-examining 
the collective representation of Black interest in Congress. In doing so, I find it essential that we invest 
in updating our understanding of the modern Congressional Black Caucus as they increase in numbers, 
influence, and outcomes. This is much different than investigating the behavior Black lawmakers. 
Examining the Caucus means, first, examining the caucus in a way that distinguishes the organization 
from the preferences and behaviors of individual Black lawmakers. This also means that there should 
be a considerable amount of effort devoted to bringing to light organizational features and strategies 
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that shape the collective behavior within the chamber. To this end, I prescribe four avenues that 
researchers should consider. 
 
Allow for the evolution of issues, preferences, and collective behaviors over time.  
Haynes Walton argues evolution is in the nature of Black political actors. He points out Black 
political behavior “undergoes cycles of stagnation, deviation, and regeneration. The flux of social 
growth and decay affects the black political milieu as it does any sociopolitical milieu. In short, the 
current realities of black political patterns might not be the same tomorrow.” (Walton 1985, 8). As 
previously discussed, institutional change has had tremendous effects on the Congressional Black 
Caucus. Black lawmakers must also allow for their behavior to evolve to account for and adapt to 
ever-changing political climates. Therefore, we should expect to find over-time variations in the 
actions and pursuits of the caucus that are directly related to the institutional and policy environment 
that they are forced to operate under.  
 The reality is, Black lawmakers are subject to internal and external forces that almost demand 
and dictate an evolution in behaviors over time. First, members must undergo political and policy 
learning that come either through trial and error or through other processes of engagement. Change 
is promoted internally, as the organization is constantly the subject of a number of slow-moving extra-
party processes that all have a substantial impact on their policy goals and pursuits. Trial and error can 
be beneficial if there is a learning process that comes as a consequence of failure (Wildavsky 1979; 
May 1992). Moreover, adjustments in behavior that are rooted in learning often take time and, likely, 
additional rounds of learning to lead to success. Additionally, the caucus is constantly undergoing 
internal changes of membership. While Black lawmakers occupy generally safe seats, turnover is 
inevitable. However, the change associated with turnover is likely to be moderated – in large part – by 
the electoral security of its current members. Larger shocks may be the result of large-scale 
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generational restructuring among its members, as younger members take a more pragmatic, 
deracialized approach to Black-interest advocacy (Canon 1995; Gillespie 2010). 
There are also external factors that promote incremental alterations in member behavior. The 
advocacy of Black issues in the House of Representatives is the product of – and a victim to – a 
number of slow-moving processes. First and foremost, the caucus is invested in breaking down 
centuries worth of institutional barriers to participation, access, and attention to Black-interest areas. 
Doing so means the Congressional Black Caucus is faced with the daunting task of changing the 
culture of the institution from within. Second, a major theoretical assumption presented in this work 
is that the CBC will concentrate its efforts on redefining policy images. Effectiveness in this venture 
will require to chip away, slowly, at the pre-existing dominant policy image and replace it with a less 
contentious, more palatable one.  
 
Examine all phases of the legislative process. 
The examination of Black legislative behavior has had a tendency to bracket the legislative 
process. An overwhelming emphasis on voting behavior and bill sponsorship – either directly or 
through the use of proxies like ideological scores or interest group ratings – has created a limited 
understanding of the behavior of Black representatives. While floor behaviors can be informative, this 
approach omits a significant portion of the actual collective activities of the Congressional Black 
Caucus. More importantly roll-call voting behavior is not necessarily indicative of decision making 
that considers the issue and solution in question and all possible alternatives. It is the product of a 
binary choice between the status quo (which is likely problematic for marginalized communities) and 
the proposed alternative to the status quo (which is likely derived without the consideration of 
perspectives from marginalized communities). Examinations of bill sponsorship can become similarly 
problematic if discussions of context, design, and strategy do not accompany the analysis.  
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 Our understanding of Black-interest representation in Congress would be vastly improved by 
considering all phases of the legislative process. We have, unfortunately, developed a habit of 
downplaying the less tangible, measurable activities within the chamber. Each chapter in this project 
engaged different stages of congressional activity to, hopefully, illuminate the value of expanding the 
scope of inquiry.  Some have taken on the task of evaluating the activities of African American 
congresspersons beyond voting and sponsorship. Such ventures have yielded valuable – and arguably, 
more interesting – insights and perspectives that have certainly advanced an otherwise stagnant 
conception of racial representation. It is my hope that others continue in the line of Mary 
Hawkesworth (2003), Katrina Gamble (2007; 2011), and Michael Minta (2011) in building a more 
comprehensive understanding of Black legislative behavior by considering debate and deliberation, 
committee activities, amendment procedures, coalition building, and other forms of communication 
within the chamber. 
 
Expand conversations of legislative agenda-setting beyond parties, leadership, and pivots. 
Scholarly conversations surrounding legislative agenda setting in the House of Representatives 
have been largely shaped by majoritarian or partisan considerations. There is also a concentration on 
the manipulation of rules, structures, and assignments to better achieve party goals. However, some 
would argue there exists a need to “move beyond our static conception of a single, identifiably pivotal, 
legislator to consider the institutional structures that enable groups of lawmakers to shape political 
outcomes in the House and Senate” (Rubin 2017, 298) . For this reason, I find it important to explain 
the possibility that minoritarian influence can be achieved in lawmaking institutions. Here, the term 
minoritarian influence takes on dual meanings. Both are quite literal; both are also understudied in 
congressional scholarship. The first mode of majoritarian influence centers on questions of how those 
in the numerical minority in a political institution can shape processes and outcomes. The second 
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concentrates on how underrepresented groups can reshape processes and outcomes in an institution 
shaped by racialized and gendered ordering.  
While access to institutional features is important, I present a perspective that argues 
minoritarian influence can be less about gaining access to parts of the policy process that have long 
been denied and more about shaping parts of the process that they can. It emphasizes, agendas are 
shaped by shifts in attention. More importantly, it is becoming increasingly possible to draw attention 
to particular problems in the modern congress than in previous iterations. For Black lawmakers, there 
are new pathways to shaping legislative agendas, new avenues to acquiring vital information, and new 
actors to partner with in search of substantive policy change. A minoritarian theory could also fill in 
admirably where dominant theories struggle to account for ever-changing dynamics within the 
chamber.  
Agenda authority is not as cut-and-dry as dominant theories of the legislative process suggests 
it would be, as blocs of lawmakers have been successful in capturing legislative agendas. As Republican 
Paul Ryan (R-WI) discovered in his brief tenure as Speaker, a relatively small bloc of legislators can 
have a dramatic impact on the party’s legislative agenda. Political parties in the twenty-first century are 
coalitions of coalitions, Positive agenda change will likely be the result of inter-coalitional cooperation 
in shared interests.  It has also been shown – through actions on the part of the Freedom Caucus and 
progressive Democrats – that this fragmentation can result in the cooptation of the legislative agenda 
by influential groups. With party fragmentation becoming increasingly pronounced in the post-reform 
era, majoritarian mandates at an institutional or party level are becoming decreasingly critical to 
influencing legislative agendas.  Minoritarian influence is becoming increasingly possible in the modern 
congressional environment. 
A groups-focused theory of positive agenda setting in the House must come to grips with 
several realities. For example, agenda control is now characterized as a tug-of-war between rank and 
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file members and congressional leadership; leadership currently has the upper-hand (Sinclair 2011; 
Curry 2015). It must acknowledge the struggles of shaping attention while working from a position of 
disadvantage – rather it be through the denial of vital information pertinent to lawmaking (Curry 
2015), the denial of access to avenues of lawmaking  (Hawkesworth 2003; Griffin and Keane 2011), 
or through a denial of institutional resources (Owens 2011; Clarke 2018). However, as researchers 
work through these concerns, a theory of group influence could prove valuable for a better 
understanding of congressional politics.  
 
Be deliberate about incorporating policy process theories into congressional studies. 
The Congressional Black Caucus has transformed into an organization that concentrates its 
efforts on reshaping the legislative priorities of the Democratic Party by reconfiguring how they frame, 
communicate, and coalesce around policy.  The caucus seeks to engage in positive agenda-setting 
despite occupying positions of disadvantage within the chambers of Congress by working collectively 
to (1) shift institutional attention towards more favorable dimensions of policy issues of interest, (2) 
process and broker information, and (3) build reliable coalitions around shared policy interests. 
Unfortunately, I have found that traditional congressional approaches fall short in explaining many of 
these behaviors – both in relation to the CBC and more broadly in the institution. 
Throughout this project I have discovered that engaging with presumptions more commonly 
associated with theories of the policy process has a number of distinct advantages that could prove 
useful for those looking to expand our knowledge of Black representative behavior. First, doing so 
allows for scholars take part in more issue-driven discussions that are shockingly absent in more 
mainline congressional studies. Policy process literature provides me with a theoretical platform to 
engage with questions concerning the nature of policy issues that face Black America – including how 
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these issue are defined (Rochefort and Cobb 1994; Baumgartner and Jones 2015) and how policy 
actors construct issues (Schneider and Ingram 1993; 2019; Barbehön 2020).  
Policy process literature also allows researchers to engage with questions of how systems (and 
subsystems) respond to the nature of issues. Early contributions of process theories provides insights 
into how different policies create different politics (Lowi 1964). Since generations of scholars have 
devoted careers to exploring how issues are prioritized (Cobb and Elder 1971; Kingdon 2011; 
Baumgartner and Jones 1991; Jones and Baumgartner 2005), how groups coalesce around core beliefs 
and policy interests (i.e. Jenkins-Smith et al. 2018; Sabatier 1988; 1991), how policy actors and elites 
improve their understanding of the policy and political environment (for example Wildavsky 1979; 
May 1992; Bennett and Howlett 1992; Albright Elizabeth A. 2011; Weible 2008), and how institutions 
react to strategic policy action (Adler and Wilkerson 2012). Most importantly, policy process is better 
equipped to investigating if, how, and why policy change happens (Lindblom 1959; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Baumgartner, Jones, and Mortensen 2017; Pierson 2011). 
I hope that this work serves as a window into the vast potential of working at the intersection 
of traditional institutional and policy process literatures. These perspectives have proven to be 
complementary and has the potential to fill voids where mainstream legislative studies have proven to 
be insufficient.  It illuminates the benefits of drawing on policy process literatures to enhance our 
understanding of congressional behavior and provide a more robust theoretical foundation to stand 
on. 
 
Conclusion 
Those invested in building knowledge around the representation of Black interest must 
embrace the evolution of the organization, their preferences, and their collective strategy. This may 
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require rethinking how we engage and evaluate the representation of Black interests. This means, first, 
drawing on methodologies and treatments that allow for such a change. If our considerations of issues, 
measures, and modes of representation are stagnant in nature, are we effectively capturing the true 
value of diversity within political institutions. We may also need to revisit – and update – many of the 
foundational works concerning Black representation to account for changes over time.  
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Endnotes: 
 
 Chapter 2 
i For example, a speech given in the 113th Congress entitle “CBC Hour: Voting Rights Act, Section 5” would be categorized under major topic area 
“Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties” and the minor topic “Voting Rights, Participation, and Related Issues” according to the CAP coding 
scheme. In some instances, speech titles were assigned by the Congressional Record. In these cases, we confirmed the veracity of the Record’s categorization 
and coded speeches themes accordingly. 
 
ii Generally, transitions were organized conveniently in the Congressional Record transcript. Speeches were well organized and orated, and our identification 
of the dimension shifts was aided by obvious transitions. In the case that representatives made clear and intentional dimension shifts mid-sentence, we 
coded each dimension accordingly. 
 
iii The selection of the Optimal community detection algorithm was not an arbitrary one. We compared the results from the Optimal community 
detection algorithm to six other modes of community detection. The modal number of communities was four (in Optimal, Spinglass, Multi-level, and 
Louvain). These four groupings also resulted in identical cluster memberships. Edge-betweeness produced a similar number of groups (3) as Fast-
greedy with a lower modularity score. Other modes of community detection were either abnormally fragmented (Walktrap) or were unable to detect 
distinct communities (Infomap). 
 
iv While the categorization of issues is relatively consistent, the two models do disagree when attempting to place general health, healthcare reform, and 
elderly issues. The Fast-Greedy algorithm clusters these issues in with economic policies while the most other models finds their shared attributes distinct 
enough to establish a completely separate cluster. 
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Chapter 3 
 
1This is likely a product of an increase in the number of Black representatives in the chamber during that time. 
2Scholars have pointed out that certain steps can be fast-tracked, or bypassed altogether, at the will of leadership. 
 
